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Abstract
This Note argues that attorneys have an affirmative duty to inform defendants of the immi-
gration ramifications of guilty please. Part I analyzes the general test for ineffective assistance
of counsel, the rules and standards related to guilty please and the overlap between criminal law
and immigration law. Part II examines the split of authority in the lower courts over whether
misinforming or failing to inform defendants about immigration reprecussions should result in re-
versal of guilty pleas. Part III argues that attorneys have a duty to inform aliens of the deportation
possibilities of guilty pleas.
NOTES
WEAKNESS OF THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES
DOCTRINE: COUNSEL'S DUTY TO INFORM
ALIENS OF THE DEPORTATION
CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS
INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment' to the U.S. Constitution guaran-
tees that defendants in criminal trials have the right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel.2 Ineffective assistance of counsel
occurs when attorneys' representations drop below an objec-
tive standard of reasonableness and such representations re-
sult in prejudice to defendants' cases. Frequently, defendants
seek to have their guilty pleas vacated based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. 4 In order to establish ineffective assist-
ance, defendants first must prove that their attorneys' repre-
sentations were objectively unreasonable.5 Second, they must
show prejudice by proving that they would not have entered
guilty pleas and would have insisted on going to trial if their
attorneys had behaved reasonably. 6
Frequently, aliens7 attempt to have their guilty pleas re-
versed due to ineffective assistance of counsel because their at-
torneys either misinformed or failed to inform them that their
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all crimi-
nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Coun-
sel for his defence." Id.
2. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (defining right to
counsel as right to effective assistance of counsel).
3. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (setting forth modem
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel).
4. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 55 (1985) (describing and rejecting
defendant's argument that counsel was ineffective because he misinformed defendant
about parole eligibility).
5. Id. at 58-59 (setting forth modem standard for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel related to guilty pleas).
6. Id. at 59.
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 1 101(a)(3) defines an
alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Id. The Govern-
ment estimates that approximately 630,000 aliens move permanently to the United
States each year and that as many as 3,000,000 undocumented aliens live in the
United States. 66 Interpreter Rels. 534-35 (May 15, 1989) (digesting "The Presi-
dent's Comprehensive Triennial Report on Immigration 1989").
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convictions" could result in deportation.9 Under U.S. immi-
gration law, many criminal convictions can result in deporta-
tion of non-U.S. citizens.' 0 Convictions that are relatively mi-
nor for citizens can lead to deportation for non-citizens."
Aliens often plead guilty to criminal charges, however, after
consulting with counsel, unaware of the potential immigration
ramifications.' 2
Courts disagree over the right of aliens to have guilty
pleas set aside due to counsels' failure to inform defendants
about deportation consequences of guilty pleas.' 3 Although a
8. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 1251(a)(2) provides
for deportation based on convictions. Id. For immigration purposes, convictions will
be found where
(1) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or [the alien] has entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a
finding of guilty;
(2) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint
on the person's liberty to be imposed (including but not limited to incarcer-
ation, probation, a fine or restitution, or community-based sanctions such as
a rehabilitation program, a work-release or study-release program, revoca-
tion or suspension of a driver's license, deprivation of nonessential activities
or privileges, or community service); and
(3) a judgment or adjudication of guilt may be entered if the person violates
the terms of [the alien's] probation or fails to comply with the requirements
of the court's order, without availability of further proceedings regarding
[the alien's] guilt or innocence of the original charge.
Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546, 551-52 (BIA 1988).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (describ-
ing defendant's argument that court should permit him to withdraw his guilty plea
because his attorney failed to inform him that conviction might result in deporta-
tion).
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(l)-(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Sections 1251(a)(l)-(5)
delineate the crimes that potentially subject aliens to deportation. Id.
11. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11 th Cir. 1985). In Camp-
bell, ajamaican national and permanent resident of the United States entered a guilty
plea to possession of marijuana and received a sentence of two years probation. Id.
at 765-66. Mrs. Campbell was the wife of a U.S. citizen and the mother of three
minor children who were also U.S. citizens. Id. at 766. Following her conviction, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service brought deportation proceedings against
her. Id. She attempted unsuccessfully to have her guilty plea vacated as involuntary
because she was unaware of the deportation consequences of such a plea. Id.
12. See, e.g., Campbell, 778 F.2d at 765-66 (describing defendant's argument that
entry of guilty plea took place after consultation with counsel, without awareness of
potential deportation consequences); Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534
(1 th Cir. 1985) (same).
13. Compare State v. Malik, 680 P.2d 770, 771-72 (Wash. Ct. App.) (holding that
counsel has no duty to inform defendant of deportation consequences), appeal denied,
102 Wash. 2d 1023 (1984) with People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)
(holding that counsel's representation is ineffective if counsel fails to investigate rele-
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majority of courts hold that attorneys have no affirmative duty
to inform defendants about potential immigration problems,' 4
some courts hold that attorneys have an affirmative duty to in-
form defendants about such possibilities.' 5 Other courts hold
that under certain circumstances providing misinformation
about deportation possibilities, as opposed to failure to in-
form, render counsels' assistance ineffective.' 6
This Note argues that attorneys have an affirmative duty to
inform defendants of the immigration ramifications of guilty
pleas. Part I analyzes the general test for ineffective assistance
of counsel, the rules and standards related to guilty pleas and
the overlap between criminal law and immigration law. Part II
examines the split of authority in the lower courts over
whether misinforming or failing to inform defendants about
immigration repercussions should result in reversal of guilty
pleas. Part III argues that attorneys have a duty to inform
aliens of the deportation possibilities of guilty pleas. This
Note concludes that attorneys should have an affirmative duty
to warn aliens of the deportation ramifications of guilty pleas,
vant areas of law, including immigration law when defendant is alien) and United
States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586, 590 (E.D. Mich.) (holding that represen-
tation may be ineffective under certain circumstances if counsel misinforms defend-
ant about deportation consequences) afd, 831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
that counsel has no duty to inform defendants about deportation consequences of
guilty pleas); United States v. George, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); United
States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1988) (same); Campbell, 778 F.2d at 768
(same); Malik, 680 P.2d 770 (same); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska) (same),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1972).
15. See, e.g., Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (holding that counsel has affirmative duty to
inform defendants of relevant consequences of guilty pleas including deportation
consequences, when defendants are known to be aliens); People v. Soriano, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (same); see also People v. Ford, 290 N.Y. LJ. 24 (Mar.
31, 1993) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (holding that trial judge has duty to inform defendant
of deportation consequences of guilty plea if defendant could not reasonably expect
that a plea of guilty "involves an admission of grossly immoral activity").
16. See, e.g., Downs-Morgan, 765 F.2d at 1541 (holding narrowly that representa-
tion is ineffective if counsel misinforms defendant about deportation consequences
of guilty plea, if defendant' has colorable claim of innocence, and defendant faces
execution upon returning to native country); Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. at 591
(holding that representation is ineffective if counsel misinforms defendant about de-
portation consequences of guilty plea and defendant has colorable claim of inno-
cence); People v. Correa, 465 N.E.2d 507 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that representation
is ineffective if counsel misinforms defendant about deportation consequences of
guilty plea), aff'd, 485 N.E.2d 307 (I1. 1984).
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and that failure to inform, when it prejudices defendants'
cases, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION REGARDING THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE RULES
GOVERNING GUILTY PLEAS AND THE
OVERLAP BETWEEN CRIMINAL
LA W AND IMMIGRATION LA W
Three major areas of law are involved when aliens attempt
to have guilty pleas set aside due to ineffective assistance of
counsel based on attorney misinformation or failure to inform
regarding the potential deportation ramifications of their
pleas: the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the rules and
standards relating to guilty pleas, and the overlap between
criminal law and immigration law. In contesting such guilty
pleas, aliens generally invoke the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, arguing that counsels' representations were constitu-
tionally ineffective.' 7 Because of counsels' ineffective repre-
sentations, aliens argue that their convictions should be va-
cated and their guilty pleas set aside because such pleas were
involuntary and not made intelligently as required by the rules
governing guilty pleas.' 8 These arguments address the over-
lap between criminal law and immigration law,' 9 and often in-
volve the "collateral consequences" doctrine, ° which states
17. See, e.g., Campbell, 778 F.2d at 766 (describing defendant's argument that
counsel's failure to inform defendant of deportation consequences of guilty plea con-
stitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 227
(5th Cir. 1985) (same); Pozo, 746 P.2d at 525-26 (same).
18. See, e.g., Campbell, 778 F.2d at 766 (describing defendant's argument that
guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelligently made due to counsel's failure to in-
form defendant about deportation consequences of guilty plea); Gavilan, 761 F.2d at
227-28 (same); Pozo, 746 P.2d at 526 (same).
19. See, e.g., Campbell, 778 F.2d at 766. The Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice [hereinafter INS] sought the defendant's deportation pursuant to what is now 8
U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (formerly 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(l 1)
(1970 & Supp. 1985)) after defendant received two years probation for possession of
marijuana. Id.; Pozo, 746 P.2d at 525. In Pozo, the INS sought the defendant's depor-
tation pursuant to what is now 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
(formerly 8 U.S.C. 1251 (a)(4) (1982)) after the defendant received a sentence of two
years for escape and two years and six months for sexual assault. Id.
20. See, e.g., Campbell, 778 F.2d at 768 (holding that possibility of deportation is
collateral consequence that defendant need not be informed of prior to pleading
guilty); Gavilan, 761 F.2d at 228 (same); State v. Malik, 680 P.2d 770, 772 (Wash. Ct.
App.) (same), appeal denied, 102 Wash.2d. 1023 (Wash. 1984).
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that defendants have no right, prior to pleading guilty, to learn
about certain consequences of convictions that are not direct
consequences of the sentences imposed by the trial judges."1
A. Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in criminal prose-
cutions defendants have the right to the assistance of coun-
sel.2" Originally, the Sixth Amendment did not mandate the
appointment of counsel, but guaranteed that the government
would not deny assistance to defendants who retained their
own counsel. 3 Beginning in the 1930s, the U.S. Supreme
Court started to reinterpret the Sixth Amendment, requiring
the appointment of counsel in certain situations.24 In federal
21. See, e.g., Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that
possibility of losing driver's license is collateral consequence that defendant need not
be informed of prior to pleading guilty); Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336, 338 (D.C.
Cir. 1963) (holding that possibility of discharge from armed forces following convic-
tion is collateral consequence that defendant need not be informed of prior to plead-
ing guilty).
22. See supra note 1 (setting forth text of Sixth Amendment).
23. See, e.g., Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1944). Mr. Holtzoff argues that the Sixth Amendment did not
impose upon judges the duty to appoint counsel to indigent defendants. Id. at 8. It
only provided the right to counsel if retained by the defendant, placing no affirmative
duty upon the state. Id. After the Bill of Rights was proposed, Congress, on April 3,
1790, passed an act that required the appointment of counsel in capital cases. Id.
According to Mr. Holtzoff, this statutory provision would be superfluous if the Sixth
Amendment imposed an affirmative duty to assign counsel. Id. In addition, because
the statutory mandate applied only to capital cases, the act implied that in non-capital
cases, no such duty to assign counsel existed. Id.
Prior to 1938, many federal courts, as a matter of practice, appointed counsel to
defendants accused of grave offenses. Id. Other courts only appointed counsel if
defendants specifically requested such appointments. Id. Counsel was not appointed
to defendants who intended to plead guilty. Id. None of these practices was based
on any constitutional duty until the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. Zerbst. Id.
at 9. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding that absent a valid
waiver, counsel must be provided to defendants who cannot or do not secure coun-
sel).
24. Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 468. The Supreme Court construed the Sixth Amend-
ment to require not only that the assistance of counsel not be denied to those who
are able to retain counsel, but that courts must provide counsel to defendants who,
absent a valid waiver, cannot or do not secure counsel. Id. The Supreme Court
stated that
[i]f the accused ... is not represented by counsel and has not competently
and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth Amendment
stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence depriving
him of his life or his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial
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criminal proceedings, the Court required appointment of at-
torneys absent a waiver of that right.2 5 In state courts, the doc-
trine was slower to develop, but in 1979 the Supreme Court
held that the state must appoint attorneys in cases where im-
prisonment results, absent a valid waiver, if defendants cannot
or do not retain their own attorneys.2 6
1. Effective Assistance of Counsel
The right to assistance of counsel stems from the belief
may be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete
the court - as the Sixth Amendment requires - by providing counsel for
an accused who is unable to obtain counsel, who has not intelligently waived
this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this re-
quirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed.
Id.
25. Id.; see Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that defendant has
constitutional right to proceed without counsel if defendant voluntarily and intelli-
gently elects to do so and that state may not force defendant to be represented by
counsel).
26. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979). Shortly after Zerbst, the
Supreme Court held, in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942), that the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment. Id. Thus, defendants did not have a constitutional right to
counsel in all state court proceedings. Id. The Court held that due process required
an inquiry into the fundamental fairness of any given proceeding, but the Sixth
Amendment was not the appropriate vehicle for relief. Id. The Court found that an
adult man of ordinary intelligence was competent to represent himself where the trial
involved a relatively simple issue, and they refused to find a violation of fundamental
fairness in the trial court's refusal to grant him counsel. Id. at 472-73.
Over the next 20 years, the Court found many special circumstances that re-
quired appointment of counsel in order to satisfy due process. See, e.g., Chewning v.
Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) (holding that because charge was serious and
legal questions presented were complex, great potential for prejudice to defendant
existed without assistance of counsel); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)
(holding that defendants have unqualified right to counsel in capital cases); Hudson
v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 697 (1960) (holding that counsel is necessary to protect
against prejudicial effect of co-defendant's plea in presence of jury); see generally Yale
Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61
MICH. L. REV. 219 (1962). Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the
Court overruled Betts, holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to
the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 341-
45.
After Gideon, a felony case, the Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972) that absent a waiver, defendants may not be imprisoned for any offense,
whether petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless represented by counsel. Id. at 36-37.
Finally, in Scott, 440 U.S. 367, the Court refused to extend Argersinger, holding that
defendants are not entitled to representation unless the trial actually results in im-
prisonment. Id. at 373-74.
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that legal assistance is necessary to ensure a fair trial.27 Profes-
sional prosecutors represent the state, while professional de-
fense attorneys help to minimize any imbalance in representa-
tion by adequately defending against the prosecution's case.2
Ineffective assistance of counsel, however, reduces the likeli-
hood of a just result.2
Although the U.S. Constitution does not refer to a right to
effective counsel, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel encompasses the right to the ef-
fective assistance of counsel.30 The Court first articulated the
right to effective assistance in Powell v. Alabama,3 holding that
a trial judge violated the defendants' due process rights be-
cause he did not appoint effective counsel.32 The Court held
that the defendants could not have received effective assistance
in the trial of their case because they did not receive represen-
tation until the morning of their trial.33
In the years following the Powell decision, the Supreme
Court expressed heightened concern for defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights.34 In Avery v. Alabama, 5 for example, the
defendant argued that he had been denied effective assistance
of counsel because the trial judge refused to grant him a con-
tinuance that would enable his attorneys to prepare his de-
27. See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (stating that counsel is necessary to ensure
fair trial); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (same).
28. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
29. Id. at 686.
30. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970).
31. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, a group of young African-American men were
tried for the rape of two white girls aboard a train. Id. at 49. The men were non-
residents of Alabama, and the record did not indicate that they were given an oppor-
tunity to contact friends or employ counsel. Id. at 52. They were not provided an
attorney until the morning of their trial. Id. at 53. The attorney did no investigation
and did not prepare for the trial. Id. at 58.
32. Id. The Court stated that the defendants had been denied the right to coun-
sel "in any real sense." Id.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940) (holding that mere appoint-
ment of counsel was not enough to satisfy constitutional guarantee of assistance of
counsel); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942) (holding that trial court may
not appoint same attorney to represent defendant and co-defendant who have con-
flicting interests); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (defining
right to assistance of counsel as right to effective assistance of counsel). See generally
STEPHEN SALTZBURG & DANIEL CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1023-49 (4th
ed. 1992) (analyzing development of right to effective assistance of counsel).
35. 308 U.S. 444 (1940).
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fense.3 6 The Court held that the defendant's attorneys had
represented him effectively, but stated that the mere appoint-
ment of counsel was not enough to satisfy the constitutional
guarantee of effective assistance of counsel." The Court
noted that denial of the opportunity to confer, consult and pre-
pare could turn the appointment of counsel into a sham. 8
In Glasser v. United States,3 9 the Supreme Court held that a
defendant did not receive effective assistance where the trial
judge appointed the same attorney to represent both the de-
fendant and a co-defendant.40 The Supreme Court held that
the lower court violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to assistance of counsel by permitting this conflict of in-
terest.4 ' The Court also held that the right to counsel is too
important to allow courts to make fine distinctions regarding
the amount of prejudice arising from the denial of the right.42
Finally, in McMann v. Richardson 43 the Supreme Court de-
fined the right to counsel as the right to the effective assistance
of counsel.44 In McMann, three separate defendants claimed
that they were convicted on the basis of coerced confessions.45
They sought reversal of their guilty pleas by arguing ineffective
assistance of counsel because their attorneys were mistaken
36. Id. at 445-50. In Avery, the defendant was arraigned on murder charges. Id.
at 447. His trial was called for three days later. Id. The defendant's court appointed
attorneys filed for a continuance arguing that they did not have time to prepare and
investigate the defendant's case. Id. No ruling on the motion appeared in the rec-
ord, but the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death. Id. at 448. Subse-
quently, the defendant moved for a new trial and the motion was denied. Id. at 450.
The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of this motion, holding that the defendant's
attorneys, despite having little time to prepare, performed their duties properly. Id.
37. Id. at 446.
38. Id.
39. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
40. Id. at 76. In Glasser, Mr. Glasser and four other defendants were convicted
of conspiracy to defraud the United States. Id. at 63. The court appointed Mr. Glas-
ser's attorney to also represent a co-defendant. Id. at 69. The Supreme Court
agreed with the defendant's argument that such appointment created a conflict of
interest that inhibited the conduct of the defense, preventing the defense attorney
from excluding evidence and cross examining witnesses. Id. at 76.
41. Id.; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980) (holding that defend-
ant must establish that actual conflict of interest adversely affected lawyer's perform-
ance).
42. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 76.
43. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
44. Id. at 771 n.14.
45. Id. at 761-64.
1102 FORDHAM INTERNA TIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1094
about the admissibility of the confessions.46 Their attorneys
had not informed them that their confessions might be inad-
missible.4 7 The Court stated that whether guilty pleas are vol-
untary depends on whether counsels' advice falls within the
range of advice given by competent attorneys. 4  The Court
held that counsels' advice was not ineffective simply because
the attorneys misjudged the admissibility of confessions. 49
Although the Court held that the defendants were not denied
their right to counsel, it established a defendant's right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel. 50
2. The Modern Standard for Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: Strickland v. Washington
In Strickland v. Washington,5" the Supreme Court held that
persons seeking to establish violations of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel must show objectively unreasonable at-
torney behavior and prejudice to the defense.52 First, defend-
ants must show that their attorneys' mistakes were so egre-
gious that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 3 The Court did not set
forth specific parameters for determining effective assistance
of counsel, but relied instead on the objective standards of the
legal community.54 Thus, the measure of attorney perform-
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 770-71.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 771.
51. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the defendant pleaded guilty to various
charges, including three counts of murder. Id. at 672. Prior to sentencing, counsel
spoke with the defendant but did not interview character witnesses, nor did he re-
quest a psychiatric examination or a pre-sentence report. Id. at 672-73. Counsel
claimed that he did not undertake these matters because he did not want the state to
present counter evidence concerning these matters and he felt that the trial judge
might spare the defendant the death penalty if the defendant took responsibility for
his actions. Id. The defendant, however, was sentenced to death. Id. at 675. The
defendant argued that counsel had represented him ineffectively by not interviewing
character witnesses, not requesting a psychiatric examination, and not requesting a
pre-sentence report. Id. The Supreme Court held that such choices were within the
range of reasonable assistance and did not constitute ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Id. at 699.
52. Id. at 687.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 688.
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ance is "reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms." 5 The Court stated that courts must view behavior
from the attorneys' perspectives at the time of the trials or at
the entry of the pleas so that hindsight does not distort their
evaluations. 56 In addition, defendants must specifically iden-
tify the acts or omissions giving rise to their claims, and over-
come the presumption that counsels' assistance was consistent
with reasonable professional standards.5 7
Second, defendants must show that counsels' errors
prejudiced the defendants' cases, depriving them of fair tri-
als.58 Judgments will not be set aside unless defendants show a
reasonable probability that counsels' errors altered the re-
sults. 59 In certain settings, such as conflicts of interest, courts
presume prejudice to the defense."° Generally, however, de-
fendants have the burden of affirmatively establishing preju-
dice.6' Therefore, courts will uphold convictions unless de-
fendants prove that their attorneys acted in an unreasonable
manner and that their attorneys' actions prejudiced their de-
fense.62
55. Id.
56. Id. at 689.
57. Id. at 695.
58. Id. at 687.
59. Id. at 694.
60. Id. at 692.
61. Id. at 693.
62. Id. at 687. States may, pursuant to their respective constitutions, provide
broader protection against ineffective assistance of counsel than Strickland, which rep-
resents the minimum national standards. See United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d
764, 769 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("The states are free to impose higher standards than those
required under the federal Constitution and statutes."). Although many states have
adopted Strickland as the appropriate standard under both the federal and state con-
stitutions, see, e.g., People v. Albanese, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1044 (1985); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. 1986); Chamberlain v.
State, 694 P.2d 468 (Kan. 1985), some states have provided greater protection. See,
e.g. ,Jackson v. State, 750 P.2d 821, 823-824 (Alaska 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 861
(1988) (holding that defendant must prove unreasonable attorney behavior and cre-
ate reasonable doubt that lack of competency contributed to conviction). In Jackson,
the court stated that "[a]lthough the Federal and Alaska tests for obtaining relief...
are similar, the defendant has a lesser burden of showing prejudice under the Alaska
test." 750 P.2d at 823-24; see People v. White, 370 N.W.2d 405, 408-09 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that even if attorney performs as well as lawyer with ordinary
skill in criminal law, defendant may establish ineffective assistance by proving that
but for attorney's act or omission defendant would have had reasonable chance of
acquittal); People v. Wilson, 406 N.W.2d 294, 297-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (same);
People v. Dombrowski, 163 A.D.2d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (using totality of cir-
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B. Guilty Pleas
Defendants who argue that their attorneys represented
them ineffectively claim that courts should vacate their
sentences and set aside their guilty pleas because such pleas
were not voluntarily and intelligently made. 63 Guilty pleas re-
sult in waivers of certain constitutional rights including the
right to trials by jury and the right to be confronted by wit-
nesses.64 The Supreme Court has stated that an estimated
ninety percent of all criminal convictions, and seventy to
eighty-five percent of all felony convictions, are entered
through guilty pleas.65 Recently, these percentages have risen
due to increasingly congested court dockets.66 If pleas are not
entered into voluntarily and intelligently, such pleas violate de-
fendants' due process rights.67
cumstances to determine whether defendant received meaningful representation);
People v. Baldi, 429 N.E.2d 400, 405 (N.Y. 1981) (same).
63. See, e.g., People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 525-26 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)
(describing defendant's argument that guilty plea was not voluntarily and intelli-
gently made due to counsel's failure to inform defendant about deportation conse-
quences of guilty plea); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 766 (1 1th Cir.
1985) (same); United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1985) (same).
64. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). In Brady, the defendant
pleaded guilty to kidnapping charges and was sentenced to fifty years in prison,
which was later reduced to thirty years. Id. He entered a guilty plea because he
feared the death penalty, which was authorized for kidnapping pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a). Id. The portion of 18 U.S.C. that authorized the death penalty was subse-
quently held to be unconstitutional. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
The defendant attempted to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that it was involuntary
because it was coerced out of the fear of greater punishment and because the punish-
ment that he feared was subsequently invalidated. Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-55. The
court held that the defendant was fully aware of the consequences of his plea. Id. at
755. According to the Court, guilty pleas are not invalid because they are made out
of fear of greater punishment. Id. Pleas are also not invalid when made based on
consequences that are later invalidated. Id.
65. Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 n.10.
66. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
528-29, tbl. 5.36 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire eds., 1991). In 1989,
87% of all federal criminal convictions were obtained through pleas of guilty or nolo
contendere. Id. In 1988, 91% of state felony convictions in a survey of 300 counties
were obtained through plea bargaining. Id. at 545, tbl. 5.48.
67. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (holding that defend-
ant's guilty plea was constitutionally invalid because trial judge asked no questions to
determine whether guilty plea was voluntary). A plea of guilty will not be considered
voluntary if it is the product of government threats or government coercion. Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970). A plea of guilty will not be considered
intelligent if the defendant is not aware of important elements of the offense or of the
direct consequences of the offense. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976)
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1. Constitutional and Federal Standards for Vacating
Guilty Pleas
In the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to scrutinize
lower court decisions to ensure that guilty pleas were entered
into voluntarily and intelligently.68  In McCarthy v. United
States,69 the Supreme Court vacated a defendant's sentence
and reversed his guilty plea because the trial judge had not
taken appropriate steps to ensure that the plea was knowing
and voluntary. 70 The trial judge had not inquired to determine
whether the plea was voluntary and had not asked the defend-
ant whether he understood the nature of the charge against
him.71 The Court discussed the due process requirements of
guilty pleas, but based its decision on Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (the "FRCP"). 72
The FRCP and related state statutes'7  delineate, among
(holding that defendant's plea of guilty to second degree murder was not intelli-
gently entered because defendant was not aware that intent was a crucial element of
the offense); United States v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 516 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that
plea was not entered intelligently because defendant was not sufficiently apprised of
mandatory special parole term considered to be direct consequence of guilty plea);
see generally STEPHEN SALTZBURG & DANIEL CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
802-21 (4th ed. 1992) (analyzing requirements for valid guilty pleas).
68. See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969) (reversing defend-
ant's guilty plea pursuant to Rule I I of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure because
trial judge did not inquire into whether the defendant's plea was voluntary); Boykin,
395 U.S. 238 (holding that defendant's guilty plea was constitutionally invalid be-
cause trial judge asked no questions to determine whether the defendant's plea was
voluntary).
69. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
70. Id. at 464-65. In McCarthy, the defendant pleaded guilty to tax evasion. Id.
at 461. Before he entered a plea, the judge asked the defendant if he desired to plead
guilty, if he understood that he was waiving his right to a trial by jury, if he realized
that a plea subjected him to imprisonment of up to five years and a fine as high as
$10,000 and whether his plea was induced by threats or promises. Id. The judge did
not inquire into the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge. Id.
71. Id. at 464-67.
72. Id. Rule 11 (c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, inperti-
nent part, that
[b]efore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must ad-
dress the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of,
and determine that the defendant understands ... the nature of the charge
to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by
law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law, including
the effect of any special parole or supervised release term .....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c).
73. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. P. LAw §§ 220.10-220.60 (McKinney 1992) (setting forth
New York rules governing guilty pleas).
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other things, the responsibilities of the judiciary and the rights
of defendants regarding guilty pleas.74 Rule 11 (c) of the FRCP
requires that judges ensure that defendants understand the
charges to which pleas are offered and the accompanying
mandatory minimum penalties provided by law, before ac-
cepting guilty pleas. 75  Thus, courts will vacate guilty pleas if
they are not entered into voluntarily and intelligently in ac-
cordance with Rule 11 or related state statutes, based on either
constitutional or non-constitutional grounds. Rule 32(d) of
the FRCP provides that defendants may withdraw pleas before
the imposition of sentence for any fair and just reason, and
after sentencing through direct appeals or habeas corpus pro-
ceedings.76 Therefore, courts may also permit withdrawal of
guilty pleas under the less stringent "fair and just" standard of
Rule 32(d) and similar state statutes. Prior to 1983, Rule 32(d)
authorized judges to allow defendants to withdraw pleas after
74. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. II and 32 (outlining rules and responsibilities re-
garding guilty pleas in federal court).
75. See supra note 72 (setting forth language of Rule 11 (c)).
76. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d). Rule 32(d) states that
[i]f a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is made before
sentence is imposed, the court may permit withdrawal of the plea upon a
showing by the defendant of any fair and just reason. At any later time, a
plea may be set aside only on direct appeal or by motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.
Id. Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code permits defendants to submit
habeas corpus motions to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
A number of cases cited herein, see, e.g., Sambro v. United States, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (per curiam), motion for rehearing en banc denied, 454 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (per curiam); Parrino v. United States, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 840 (1954), refer to the former Rule 32(d) which stated that "[a] motion to
withdraw a plea of guilty or nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defend-
ant to withdraw his plea." Former FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
The former Rule 32(d) did not establish the standard for pre-sentencing with-
drawal of guilty pleas. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee's note. The
amended rule established the "fair and just" standard. Id. The "manifest injustice"
standard for post-sentencing relief was repealed because it was found to be essen-
tially the same as the standard of relief already available under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1988 & Supp. III 1991), the federal habeas corpus statute. Id. Pleas may only be
vacated under this standard if permitting them to remain constitutes "a fundamental
defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage ofjustice" or "an omission
inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure." Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424 (1962). Thus, cases formerly decided pursuant to the manifest injustice
standard would today be resolved through habeas corpus proceedings. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 32(d) advisory committee's note.
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sentencing to correct "manifest injustice." 7 7 The manifest in-
justice standard was repealed because it was found to be essen-
tially the same as the standard of relief already available
through habeas corpus proceedings, 78 although state courts
continue to permit withdrawal of guilty pleas after sentencing
to prevent miscarriages ofjustice. 79 These rules serve to pro-
tect defendants' due process rights.80
In addition to the FRCP, due process rights are implicated
when defendants enter guilty pleas.8' In Boykin v. Alabama,82
the Supreme Court held that the State of Alabama. did not
show a constitutionally valid waiver of the right to a trial by
jury where the record did not indicate that the defendant's
guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent.8 " Therefore, the
Court found a due process violation and held that the defend-
ant's guilty plea was void.8
4
77. See supra note 76 (setting forth text of former Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 32(d)).
78. See supra note 76 (setting forth standard of relief for habeas corpus proceed-
ings).
79. See, e.g., People v. Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. App. 1988) (holding
that trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting alien who entered guilty plea
without awareness of deportation consequences to withdraw plea to prevent miscar-
riage of justice).
80. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (holding that guilty
plea entered into pursuant to Rule 11 must be voluntary and knowing or it is ob-
tained in violation of defendant's due process rights).
81. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)
82. Id. The defendant was arrested for common law robbery, an offense punish-
able in Alabama, at that time, by death. Id. at 239. At his arraignment, the defendant
pleaded guilty. Id. The record did not indicate that the judge had asked any ques-
tions of the defendant to ensure that the plea was entered voluntarily and intelli-
gently. Id. Because the record was wholly silent, the Supreme Court held that the
plea could not be considered voluntary. Id. at 242.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 243. Justice John M. Harlan dissented, stating that the majority
changed Rule 11 of the FRCP, which requires that judges ensure that pleas are en-
tered into knowingly and voluntarily, from a statutory to a constitutional standard by
finding a due process violation. Id. at 246-47 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court recently elaborated on the Boykin standard in Parke v. Raley, 113 S. Ct. 517,
523-24 (1992), upholding a state persistent felony offender sentencing statute that
attaches a presumption of regularity to judgments once the state proves their exist-
ence. Id. In Parke, the Court refused to invalidate a statute that places the ultimate
burden of persuasion upon the state, but once the state proves the existence of the
convictions, shifts the burden to the defendants to produce evidence of their invalid-
ity. Id. The Court further held that in collateral attacks of prior convictions, it is not
assumed from the unavailability of transcripts that defendants were not advised of
their rights prior to entering guilty pleas. Id.
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2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Relating to Guilty Pleas:
Hill v. Lockhart
The Supreme Court established constitutional standards
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims with respect to
guilty pleas in Hill v. Lockhart.8" In Hill, the Court stated that
the professional competence tier of the Strickland test remains
the same for ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on
guilty pleas.8 6 Attorney performance must be below an objec-
tively reasonable standard. 7 Under the second, or prejudice
tier, defendants must demonstrate that counsels' constitution-
ally unreasonable assistance adversely affected the outcome of
the plea process.88 Defendants must establish that, but for
counsels' errors, they would not have entered guilty pleas and
would have insisted on going to trial.89
In Hill, the defendant claimed that counsel's assistance
was constitutionally ineffective because counsel gave errone-
ous advice about parole eligibility. 90 The Court refused to de-
termine whether misinformation regarding parole eligibility
constitutes constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel be-
cause the defendant failed to establish prejudice. 9' The peti-
tioner did not allege special circumstances supporting the con-
clusion that he would not have pleaded guilty had counsel cor-
rectly informed him about his parole eligibility date.92
3. The Collateral Consequences Doctrine
Frequently, courts refuse to reverse defendants' guilty
pleas despite their lack of awareness of certain results of con-
viction that are deemed to be "collateral consequences," which
are beyond the scope of trial counsels' responsibilities. 93 Col-
85. 474 U.S. 52 (1985). In Hill, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of first
degree murder and theft of property. Id. at 53. The trial court sentenced him to
concurrent prison terms of thirty-five years and ten years. Id. at 54. The defendant's
attorney informed him that he would be eligible for parole after serving one-third of
his term, when in fact he had to serve one-half of his sentence. Id. at 55.
86. Id. at 58-59.
87. Id. at 57-58.
88. Id. at 59.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 53.
91. Id. at 60.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1985); Tafoya
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lateral consequences are results of criminal convictions that
are not considered direct consequences and are not imposed
by the sentencing judge.9 4 Courts generally do not find inef-
fective assistance of counsel when attorneys fail to inform de-
fendants about collateral consequences.95
The collateral consequences doctrine originally stated that
trial judges did not have to inform defendants of all the possi-
ble effects of criminal convictions, but only the direct conse-
quences.96 This doctrine was based on the rationale that be-
cause such a wide variety of potential consequences exist, one
could not expect judges to warn defendants about every possi-
ble result of conviction.97 Many later courts, pursuant to the
collateral consequences doctrine, ruled that attorneys also
have no duty to inform defendants about collateral conse-
quences. 9
Courts have refused to reverse defendants guilty pleas in a
variety of circumstances, holding that lack of information
about collateral consequences does not provide a basis for re-
lief.99 These circumstances include loss of the right to a
driver's license ° ° and the possibility of increased punishment
v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 252 (Ala. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973). For a com-
plete analysis of collateral consequences, see Priscilla Budeiri, Comment, Collateral
Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 157 (1981). Ms. Budeiri argues that judges should be required to present de-
fendants with lists of all possible legal consequences stemming from guilty pleas. Id.
at 199-203. This requirement, according to Ms. Budeiri, would place a minimal bur-
den on the courts and would guarantee that defendants are aware of the conse-
quences of their pleas. Id. at 202-03.
94. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974).
95. See, e.g., State v. Malik, 680 P.2d 770, 772 (Wash. App.) (holding that attor-
neys do not provide ineffective assistance of counsel when they fail to inform defend-
ants of collateral consequences of criminal convictions), appeal denied, 102 Wash.2d
1023 (1984).
96. See, e.g., Malik, 680 P.2d at 772 (holding that attorneys must only inform
defendants of direct consequences of criminal convictions).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska 1972) (holding that attorneys
have no duty to inform defendants about deportation possibilities, which it deemed a
collateral consequence), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945 (1973).
99. See Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that
imposition of consecutive rather than concurrent prison terms for plea on more than
one charge is collateral consequence); Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379, 380-81
(5th Cir. 1964) (holding that loss of right to vote and to travel abroad is collateral
consequence).
100. Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975).
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for subsequent offenses.' 0 ' In some situations, however,
courts vacate guilty pleas when attorneys fail to make certain
consequences known.' 0 2  Courts have found these conse-
quences to be direct results of conviction, rather than collat-
eral consequences. 0 3 Such consequences include failure to in-
form the defendant that a federal sentence will not begin to
run until the defendant is released from state custody, 0 4 fail-
ure to inform the defendant of a mandatory special parole
term °" and failure to inform the defendant of ineligibility for
parole. 0 6
101. See Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 561 (5th Cir. 1980); Dorrough v.
United States, 385 F.2d 887, 893 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1019 (1969);
Fee v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 674, 677-78 (W.D. Va. 1962); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (stating that persons convicted of certain crimes
lose right to possess firearms); United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir.)
(holding that loss of civil service employment is collateral consequence), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 995 (1976); Paradiso, 482 F.2d at 415 (holding that imposition of consecu-
tive rather than concurrent prison terms for plea on more than one charge is collat-
eral consequence); Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 475 F.2d 1364, 1366 (4th
Cir.) (holding that possibility of civil proceeding for commitment to state mental in-
stitution is collateral consequence), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1005 (1973); Hutchison v.
United States, 450 F.2d 930, 931 (10th Cir. 1971) (holding that loss of good time
credit is collateral consequence); Waddy v. Davis, 445 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1971) (hold-
ing that disenfranchisement is collateral consequence); Mealon, 328 F.2d 379, 380-81
(holding that loss of right to vote and to travel abroad is collateral consequence);
Redwine v. Zuckert, 317 F.2d 336, 337-38 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that possibility
of discharge from armed forces is collateral consequence); United States v. Casa-
nova's, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 291, 292 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (holding that loss of business
license to sell firearms is collateral consequence).
102. See United States v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 516, 519-20 (8th Cir. 1973)
(holding that mandatory special parole term is direct consequence); United States v.
Myers, 451 F.2d 402, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that knowledge that federal
sentence will not begin to run until defendant is released from state custody is direct
consequence).
103. See Richardson, 483 F.2d at 519-20 (holding that mandatory parole term is
direct consequence); Myers, 451 F.2d at 404-05 (holding that knowledge that federal
sentence will not begin to run until defendant is released from state custody is direct
consequence).
104. Myers, 451 F.2d at 404-05.
105. Richardson, 483 F.2d at 519-20.
106. Bye v. United States, 435 F.2d 177, 179 (2d Cir. 1970); Berry v. United
States, 412 F.2d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 1969); Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689, 693
(1st Cir. 1969). A minority view finds ineligibility for parole to be a collateral conse-
quence. Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
899 (1967); Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436, 441 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 957 (1964).
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C. Overlap Between Criminal Law and Immigration Law
There is extensive overlap between criminal law and immi-
gration law.' 0 7 Although aliens share many of the same rights
and privileges that citizens enjoy, certain criminal convictions
can result in deportation for aliens.' 0 8 Therefore, dispositions
of criminal cases that do not represent convictions under the
immigration laws are preferable to aliens, because deportation
often flows from such convictions.' 0 9 Aliens convicted of
crimes who are faced with deportation, however, may be eligi-
ble for relief, such as pardons" 0 and discretionary relief from
the Attorney General.' I
1. Crimes That Expose Aliens to Potential Deportation
Many types of criminal convictions expose aliens to poten-
tial deportation." 2 Often the convictions themselves, not the
severity of the criminal sentences, have immigration repercus-
sions." 13 For example, convictions for most minor narcotics
offenses, which often result in suspended prison sentences, can
result in deportation for aliens.' "4
Aliens may be deported from the United States if con-
victed of a crime involving moral turpitude and sentenced to
imprisonment or imprisoned for one year or longer, within five
years of entering the United States.' ' 5 Aliens may also be de-
107. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Section 1251(a)(2) deline-
ates the crimes that potentially subject aliens to deportation. Id.
108. Id. Certain behavior that is not associated with criminal convictions can
also have deportation consequences. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988 &
Supp. III 1991) (stating that drug addicts and drug abusers are deportable).
109. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
110. 8 U.S.C. 1251(a)(2)(A)(iv) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (authorizing pardons to
aliens who are deportable due to convictions for crimes of moral turpitude and ag-
gravated felonies).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (delineating crimes that po-
tentially subject aliens to deportation).
113. Id. Aliens who are convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, within
five years of entering the country and are sentenced to confinement or are confined
for one year or more may be deported. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. III
1991). All other convictions that potentially subject aliens to deportation do not con-
sider the length of imprisonment. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
114. See supra note 11 (describing case where deportation proceedings were in-
stituted following minor narcotics conviction).
115. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Moral turpitude has
never been comprehensively defined, but the Board of Immigration Appeals (the
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ported, at any time after entry, if convicted of two crimes in-
volving moral turpitude, not arising out of the same "scheme
of misconduct-."' "6 Such aliens may be deported regardless of
the sentences imposed as a result of the convictions."t 7 In ad-
dition, aliens convicted of aggravated felonies are subject to
deportation." 1 8
Violations of various other statutes make aliens eligible for
deportation as well.' 19 Generally, aliens may be deported for
any violation of, or conspiracy to violate, U.S. narcotics laws. 120
Aliens may be deported following convictions under any law
related to purchase, possession or sale of firearms or destruc-
tive devices.12 Finally, aliens may be deported for convictions
under certain federal statutes related to sedition, sabotage,
treason, espionage or certain violations of the Military Selec-
tive Service Act or the Trading with the Enemy Act.
122
2. Relief from Deportation
Despite the consequences of the immigration laws, some
"Board") has described it as "conduct that shocks the public conscience as being
inherently base, vile or depraved, contrary to the rules of morality and the duties
owed to one's fellow man or society in general." Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N 669, 670
(BIA 1988). To determine whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude, the
Board examines, on a case-by-case basis, the statute violated and the defendant's
record of convictions. Matter of Esfandiary, 16 I&N 659 (BIA 1979). For a list of
crimes that have been found to entail moral turpitude, see RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL
ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 11.03(a) (2d ed. 1992).
116. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
117. Id.
118. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iii) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The Immigration
and Naturalization Service may deport any alien convicted of an aggravated felony, at
any time after the alien enters the United States. Id. Immigration law defines aggra-
vated felonies to include murder, drug or firearms trafficking or conspiracy or at-
tempt to commit such crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) and (D) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
120. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Aliens, however, are
not subject to deportation for a single offense of possession for one's own use of
thirty grams or less of marijuana. Id. They may be deported for multiple offenses
involving less than thirty grams of marijuana or possession other than for one's own
use. Id. Also, aliens may be deported if they are, or at any time after entry to the
United States become, drug abusers or drug addicts. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(B)(ii)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991).
121. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(D) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The Trading with the
Enemy Act is found at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1988 & Supp. I 1990). The Military
Selective Service Act is found at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-73 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
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relief is available for aliens faced with deportation. 123 Aliens
who may be deported because of convictions for crimes of
moral turpitude or aggravated felonies may apply for full and
unconditional pardons from the President of the United States
or a Governor of one of the states. 124 In addition, permanent
residents 25 of seven or more consecutive years may have de-
portation proceedings waived at the discretion of the Attorney
General. 26
123. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iv) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (authorizing
presidential or gubernatorial pardons in certain situations). Immigration law distin-
guishes between deportation and exclusion. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988 & Supp.
III 1991) (listing grounds for exclusion) with 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)
(listing grounds for deportation). Critical to this distinction is whether the alien has
made an "entry," defined as any "coming" into the United States, lawful or unlawful.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Frequently, aliens are paroled into
the United States by the INS. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Such
aliens are permitted into the United States if the Attorney General finds that it is in
the public interest to do so, and they are not deemed to have made an entry into the
United States. Id. Aliens who have made an entry may be subject to deportation
proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Aliens who have not made
an entry may be subject to exclusion proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988 & Supp. III
1991). Although many grounds for exclusion are also grounds for deportation, see,
e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (permitting exclusion of
aliens convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude) and 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(2)(A)(i)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991) (permitting deportation of aliens convicted of crimes involv-
ing moral turpitude), many grounds for exclusion are not also grounds for deporta-
tion. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991)(permitting exclu-
sion of aliens who admit having committed or admit having committed acts that con-
stitute the essential elements of crimes of moral turpitude); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (permitting exclusion of aliens who have
communicable diseases of public health significance); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(ii)
(1988 & Supp. III 1991) (permitting exclusion of aliens with physical or mental disor-
ders that may pose threats property, safety or welfare of aliens or others).
124. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(iv) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
125. See STEEL, supra note 115, § 2.08 (stating that permanent resident is person
intending to, and granted permission by INS to remain in United States on perma-
nent basis). For a discussion of the requirements for permanent resident status, see
STEEL, supra note 115, §§ 4.01-4.19, §§ 5.01-5.27.
126. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). This relief is unavailable to
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies who have served at least five years in prison.
Id. Section 1182(c) provides that the Attorney General may waive grounds of exclud-
ability for permanent residents of seven or more consecutive years who are returning
from temporary trips abroad. Id. Although the provision applies only to aliens who
are returning to the United States, courts have applied the provision to deportation
proceedings, holding that no rational basis exists for applying it solely to exclusion
proceedings. See, e.g., Francis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 532 F.2d 268
(2d Cir. 1976); Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, Interim Dec. 3147 (BIA 1990); Matter
of Silva, 16 I&N 26 (BIA 1976). Such relief is only available if aliens are found de-
portable on grounds for which there are comparable grounds of exclusion. See, e.g.,
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Aliens may also have deportation suspended under certain
circumstances. 2 7  Deportation may be suspended if aliens
have lived in the United States for seven or ten years depend-
ing upon the crime, show good moral character, and if depor-
tation would result in extreme hardship to themselves, or to
relatives who are citizens or permanent residents.12 If suspen-
sion of deportation is granted, aliens are thereby converted to
permanent residents. 129
Aliens may also be granted voluntary departure in lieu of
deportation proceedings." 0 Aliens who are granted voluntary
departure are not barred from returning to the United States
as lawful immigrants. 13 ' The disadvantage for aliens who are
granted voluntary departure, of course, is that they must im-
mediately leave the United States.
Aliens who are faced with deportation have several other
possible sources of relief. By proving a possibility of persecu-
tion upon being deported, they may receive asylum 132 or they
may be granted withholding of deportation. 33 Also, immigra-
tion judges have discretion to terminate deportation proceed-
ings to permit aliens to proceed to final naturalization hear-
ings, if such aliens show a likelihood of success and if humani-
tarian factors make termination appropriate.' 34 Finally, under
Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir. 1988); Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, In-
terim Dec. 3147 (BIA 1990).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
128. Id. Suspension of deportation may be rescinded under certain circum-
stances. 8 U.S.C. § 1256 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). In the ten year cases, the hardship
necessary for suspension of deportation must be "exceptional and extremely unu-
sual." 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1991).
130. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The vast majority (97.5%) of
aliens who are detained by the INS opt for voluntary departure. See INS v. Lopez-
Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984) (stating that majority of aliens who are faced
with deportation proceedings opt for voluntary departure).
131. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A-B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Deportation pre-
cludes aliens from returning to the United States for five years, or twenty years for
aliens convicted of aggravated felonies. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(B)(iv) (1988 & Supp.
II 1991).
132. 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see STEEL, supra note 115,
§ 8.07(a) (analyzing requirements for granting of asylum).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); see STEEL, supra note 115
§ 14.35 (analyzing requirements for withholding of deportation).
134. 8 C.F.R. § 242.7(e) (1992). Aliens must establish prima facie eligibility for
naturalization and case must involve "exceptionally appealing or humanitarian fac-
tors." Id.
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exceptional circumstances, Congress may enact legislation per-
mitting aliens to remain in the United States as permanent res-
idents.13 5
Prior to the 1990 amendment to the Immigration and Na-
tionalization Act, aliens who were deportable because of con-
victions for crimes of moral turpitude or aggravated felonies
had one additional avenue of relief.'3 6 They were permitted to
apply for Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation
("JRADs").'3 7 Sentencing judges, following application by de-
fendants, had the power to issue orders, binding upon the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service, that the convictions not
be used for deportation purposes. '
3 8
As a result, injanvier v. United States,' 3 9 an attorney's fail-
ure to apply for a JRAD resulted in a successful charge of inef-
fective assistance of counsel.' 40 In Janvier, the court vacated
the guilty plea of a Haitian citizen, and permanent resident of
the United States, who had pleaded guilty to smuggling coun-
terfeit currency into the United States.' 4 ' The defendant
claimed that counsel's representation did not meet the consti-
tutional minimum required by Strickland because counsel failed
to request a JRAD after sentencing.' 42 Counsel admitted that
he was unaware of the deportation consequences and that he
made no effort to determine if such circumstances existed.'
43
The court stated that this failure to investigate applicable law
could not be considered adequate attorney behavior under
prevailing professional norms, and thus vacated the defend-
ant's guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel.'
44
In 1990, however, Congress repealed the Judicial Recommen-
135. See STEEL, supra note 115, § 14.37(d) (stating that Congress may enact leg-
islation permitting aliens to remain in the United States).
136. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2) (1988).
137. Id.
138. Id. If, however, defendants did not apply for JRADs within 30 days, any
subsequent judicial orders were not binding upon the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service. Matter of Tafoya-Gutierrez, 13 I&N 342 (BIA, 1969).
139. 659 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), on remand from, 793 F.2d 447 (2d Cir.
1986).
140. Id. at 828-29.
141. Id. at 829.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 829.
144. Id. The court stated that although failure to seek aJRAD could conceivably
serve a strategic purpose, such circumstances were not present. Id. at 828-29.
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dation Against Deportation provision' 45 because it felt that
sentencing judges who have expertise regarding criminal law
issues should not pass binding judgments concerning immigra-
tion issues. 146
II. SPLIT OF AUTHORITY CONCERNING COUNSEL'S DUTY
TO INFORM ALIENS OF THE DEPORTATION
CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS
Courts are split over whether failure to inform defendants
of the deportation consequences of criminal convictions by
trial counsel necessitates reversal of guilty pleas. 147 A majority
of federal and state courts hold that counsels' failure to inform
defendants of these consequences does not necessitate rever-
sal of guilty pleas. Most of these courts hold that such behav-
ior does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.' 48 On
the other hand, some state courts have vacated guilty pleas,
holding that counsel have an affirmative duty to warn about
deportation possibilities. 149 To prevent miscarriages of jus-
145. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
146. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990, H.R. REP. No. 681(I), 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
147. Compare, e.g., State v. Malik, 680 P.2d 770, 771-72 (Wash. App.) (holding
that counsel has no duty to inform defendant of deportation consequences), appeal
denied, 102 Wash.2d 1023 (1984) with United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp.
586, 591 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that misinformation about deportation conse-
quences under certain circumstances renders counsel's assistance ineffective), afd,
831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987) and People y. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)
(holding that counsel has affirmative duty to inform defendants of relevant conse-
quences of guilty pleas including deportation consequences, when defendants are
aliens).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding
that counsel's failure to inform defendant about deportation consequences of guilty
pleas does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel); United States v. George,
869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Yearwood, 863 F.2d 6 (4th Cir.
1988) (same); United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764 (11th Cir. 1985) (same);
United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Sante-
lises, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975) (same); Government of Virgin Islands v. Pamphile,
604 F. Supp. 753 (D.V.I. 1985) (same); State v. Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960 (Fla. 1987)
(same); State v. Fundora, 513 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1987) (same); Mott v. State 407 N.W.2d
581 (Iowa 1987) (same); People v. Dor, 505 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1986) (same); Malik, 680
P.2d 770 (same); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska) (same), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1972).
149. See, e.g., Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (holding that counsel has affirmative duty to
inform defendants of relevant consequences of guilty pleas including deportation
consequences, when defendants are known to be aliens); People v. Soriano, 240 Cal.
Rptr. 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
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tice, some state courts have permitted defendants to withdraw
guilty pleas because they were unaware of deportation pos-
sibilities.'5 Alternatively, other state and federal courts have
held that misinforming defendants about immigration ramifi-
cations may render counsels' assistance ineffective, although
failure to inform of these ramifications does not.' 5 '
A. Courts Refusing to Vacate or Permit Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas
When Counsel Fails to Inform Aliens of Deportation Possibilities
A majority of courts refuse to vacate or permit withdrawal
of guilty pleas when counsel fails to inform defendants about
immigration consequences of guilty pleas.' 52 Although earlier
decisions base their findings on the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure that govern guilty pleas, most later cases base their
decisions on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, holding
that counsels' failure to inform does not result in ineffective
assistance of counsel. 153 Most courts that refuse to set aside
150. See People v. Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. 1988) (holding that trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting alien who entered guilty plea without
awareness of deportation possibilities to withdraw guilty plea); People v. Giron, 523
P.2d 636, 639-40 (Cal. 1974) (same). Although courts may vacate guilty pleas be-
cause of constitutional violations or because defendants' pleas were not entered into
voluntarily and intelligently pursuant to the rules governing guilty pleas, see, e.g., FED.
R. CRIM. P. 11 (c), courts also have discretion to permit defendants to withdraw guilty
pleas pursuant to the looser "miscarriage of justice" standard. Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d
at 787.
151. See, e.g., Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding narrowly that representation may be ineffective if counsel misinforms,
rather than fails to inform, defendant about deportation consequences of guilty plea,
if defendant has colorable claim of innocence, and defendant faces execution upon
returning to native country); United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (holding that representation is ineffective if counsel misinforms defend-
ant about deportation consequences of guilty plea and defendant has colorable claim
of innocence, although failure to inform does not constitute ineffective assistance),
affid, 831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987); People v. Correa, 465 N.E.2d 507 (Il. App:)
(holding that representation is ineffective if counsel misinforms defendant about de-
portation consequences of guilty plea), aff'd, 485 N.E. 2d 307 (Ill. 1984).
152. See supra note 148 (listing courts that refused to find ineffective assistance
of counsel for failing to inform aliens about deportation possibilities.)
153. Compare United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that
lack of knowledge of deportation consequences does not necessitate withdrawal of
guilty plea pursuant to Rule 32(d) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), cert. de-
nied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954) and United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(per curiam) (holding that lack of knowledge of deportation consequences does not
necessitate withdrawal of guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 and Rule 32(d) of Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure), motion for hearing en banc denied, 454 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.
1118 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL IA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1094
guilty pleas hold that attorneys have no duty to warn defend-
ants about immigration ramifications because such possibilities
are collateral consequences. 54 Therefore, these courts hold
that information about deportation is beyond the scope of trial
counsels' duties, and counsels' failure to warn does not fail to
satisfy the professional competence tier of Strickland.' 55 Other
courts, evaluating defendants' ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, refuse to vacate guilty pleas because the defendants
failed to establish prejudice. 156
1. Courts Relying on Collateral Consequences Doctrine
When Refusing to Grant Relief
In United States v. Parrino , 5 7 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, though not addressing the Sixth Amend-
ment right to effective assistance of counsel, became the first
court to state that deportation consequences are collateral. 58
In Parrino, the defendant alleged that he entered a guilty plea
based on counsel's assurance that the plea would not result in
deportation. 9 The defendant claimed that he would not have
entered the plea if counsel had not misinformed him about
these consequences. 60 He sought to withdraw his plea, claim-
ing "manifest injustice," pursuant to Rule 32(d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 61 The court, rejecting the de-
fendant's claim, held that only lack of awareness of a direct re-
sult of a conviction provides a basis for retraction of a guilty
1971) (per curiam) with Malik, 680 P.2d 770 (holding that counsel's failure to inform
defendant of deportation possibilities does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel pursuant to the Sixth Amendment) and Tafoya, 500 P.2d 247 (same).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 93-106 (analyzing collateral conse-
quences doctrine.)
155. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 768 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that counsels' behavior is reasonable despite failure to inform defendants
about deportation consequences of guilty pleas).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (refus-
ing to find ineffective assistance of counsel because defendant failed to establish prej-
udice); United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
157. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919.
158. Id. at 922.
159. Id. at 921.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 920-21. The "manifest injustice" standard has been repealed. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text (setting forth original manifest injustice stan-
dard and modem standard).
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plea. 62  The court found that immigration proceedings,
although potentially more damaging, were collateral civil pro-
ceedings and therefore did not provide a basis for retrac-
tion.' 63 The court also stated that lack of awareness of depor-
tation possibilities, resulting from erroneous information re-
ceived from the defendant's own attorney, without a showing
of unprofessional conduct, does not merit withdrawal of the
defendant's plea.' 64 The court noted that if the defendant was
misled by statements made by the judge or -by the United
States Attorney, then relief would be possible. 165 In Parrino,
however, such facts did not exist.' 66
In dissent, Judge Frank disputed the classification of de-
portation as a collateral consequence.167 He noted that depor-
tation, though not a criminal punishment, may have more se-
vere effects than a criminal sentence. 168  He described the
court's sentence as two years in prison and the rest of the de-
fendant's life in exile.' 69 Therefore, he reasoned that the de-
fendant's lack of knowledge of deportation consequences con-
stituted manifest injustice. 170
In United States v. Sambro,"' the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit expanded upon the holding in
Parrino, but also did not address the Sixth Amendment right to
162. Parrino, 212 F.2d at 921-22.
163. Id. at 922. The court stated that
[w]e do not fail to recognize the terrific impact on the defendant's life and
family of the collateral consequence of deportation. But deportability is de-
termined by the Immigration and Nationality Act . . . [aInd even if we felt
that the inflexibility of that Act was unduly harsh in its application to this
particular defendant or to others, we may not properly let sympathy, thus
engendered, by intrusion into the field of criminal administration disturb
the finality of criminal process and thus undermine effective law enforce-
ment.
Id.
164. Id. at 921.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 924 (Frank, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Frank, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Frank, J., dissenting).
170. Id. (Frank, J., dissenting). Judge Frank stated that he "cannot believe that
no 'manifest injustice' exists merely because the sentence of banishment for life was
not imposed directly by the judge." Id.
171. 454 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), motion for hearing en banc denied, 454
F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
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effective assistance of counsel. 17  In Sambro, the defendant had
moved to withdraw his plea, pursuant to the manifest injustice
standard of Rule 32(d), due to lack of knowledge of deporta-
tion ramifications, and the trial court had denied the mo-
tion.173 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court
had abused its discretion in denying this motion, and that his
plea was not voluntary and intelligent pursuant to Rule 11.174
The record indicated that both the defendant and his attorney
erroneously believed that the plea would not result in deporta-
tion.1 75 The D.C. Circuit, citing Parrino, refused to permit
withdrawal of the plea pursuant to Rule 32(d) and refused to
find that the guilty plea was not entered into voluntarily and
intelligently pursuant to Rule 11 simply because the defendant
did not understand or foresee a collateral consequence. 176
The Sambro court did not distinguish between the defense at-
torney's failure to warn about deportation possibilities and the
court's failure to warn, stating only that lack of knowledge of
the consequence does not necessitate withdrawal of the
plea. 177 Federal courts continue to hold that Rule 11 is not
violated if aliens enter guilty pleas without awareness of depor-
tation possibilities. 78
In United States v. Santelises, 179 the Second Circuit elabo-
rated on the difference between direct and collateral conse-
quences. 80 The court stated that the distinction depends
upon the degree of certainty with which the sanctions will af-
172. Id.
173. Id. at 919-20.
174. Id.; see supra note 72 and accompanying text (setting forth courts' duties
pursuant to Rule I 1 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure).
175. Sambro, 454 F.2d at 921.
176. Id. at 922-23. ChiefJudge Bazelon moved for a rehearing en banc and the
motion was denied. Id. at 924. Chief Judge Bazelon dissented from the denial. Id.
(Bazelon, J., dissenting from denial of motion for rehearing en banc). He considered
it a "close question" whether a plea is involuntary pursuant to Rule 11 if the defend-
ant lacks knowledge of deportation possibilities, though he did not decide the ques-
tion. Id. at 925. ChiefJudge Bazelon stated, however, citingJudge Frank's dissent in
Parrino v. United States, 212 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1954) (Frank, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954), that such lack of knowledge is sufficient to find manifest
injustice pursuant to Rule 32(d). Id. at 926-27.
177. Sambro, 454 F.2d at 922.
178. Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir.), cert. den., 429 U.S. 895
(1976); Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974).
179. 476 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1973), later appeal, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975).
180. Id. at 789-90.
1992-19931 COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE 1121
fect defendants.' 8 1 In Santelises, the defendant pleaded guilty
to various charges related to the preparation of false immigra-
tion documents. 82 He was sentenced to concurrent one-year
terms of probation. 83 During this probationary period, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service brought discretionary
deportation proceedings against him.' 84 The court, invoking
the collateral consequences doctrine, held that although con-
victions may lead to deportation, deportation is not such an
absolute consequence of a conviction that due process requires
judges to warn defendants of this possibility before accepting
pleas. 8 5 Therefore, the court refused to vacate the defend-
ant's plea.' 86 The Second Circuit did not address the level of
certainty necessary to make a consequence direct rather than
collateral. It stated, however, that deportation, under the facts
in Santelises, is not such an absolute consequence that it must
be considered direct.18 7
In Michel v. United States,'"" however, the Second Circuit
revised the formulation of collateral consequences espoused in
Santelises.18 9 The court held that Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure only requires that judges ensure that
defendants understand the consequences of the sentence im-
posed in that specific criminal proceeding' 90 Therefore,
under Michel, even if deportation following criminal convic-
tions amounts to an absolute certainty, because it is punish-
ment meted out by another agency, judges need not inform
defendants of such possibilities.19 '
181. Id.
182. Id. at 788.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 790. The court stated that deportation results
only upon 'order of the Attorney General' who retains discretion whether or
not to institute such proceedings. Deportation then, serious sanction
though it may be, is not such an absolute consequence of conviction that we
are mandated to read into traditional notions of due process a requirement
that a district judge must warn each defendant of the possibility of deporta-
tion before accepting his plea.
Id.
186. Id. at 789-90.
187. Id. at 790.
188. 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974).
189. Id. at 465-66.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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In Michel, the Second Circuit, elaborating upon Parrino
and Sambro, refused to grant relief when a judge failed to in-
form a defendant about a collateral consequence.19 2 The court
held that judges have no duty to warn about deportation pos-
sibilities under Rule 11, stating that the judiciary has never
been required to anticipate the "multifarious peripheral con-
tingencies" that may effect defendants.' In fact, only one
court has required that judges, under certain circumstances,
inform defendants about deportation possibilities, 94 although
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See People v. Ford, 290 N.Y. LJ. 24 (Mar. 31, 1993) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993).
In Ford, the Supreme Court of New York became the first court to hold that, under
certain circumstances, the trial judge has an affirmative duty, in order to satisfy due
process, to inform aliens of the deportation ramifications of guilty pleas. Id. In Ford,
a Jamaican citizen and permanent resident of the United States entered a guilty plea
to reckless manslaughter and was sentenced to two to six years in jail. Id. The de-
fendant, who was nineteen at the time, killed his girlfriend using a gun that he be-
lieved to be unloaded. Id. The judge stated that all parties to the incident agreed
that the shooting was a tragic accident. Id. The defendant was released from prison
on his first eligible parole date, but was subsequently moved to a deportation center
after the Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated deportation proceedings
against him because reckless manslaughter is considered a crime involving moral tur-
pitude. Id.; see supra note 115 (defining moral turpitude).
The judge in Ford stated that although deportation is a collateral consequence
that defendants normally need not be informed of in order to enter valid guilty pleas,
such rules must be viewed against the "factual background" of the cases. People v.
Ford, 290 N.Y. L.J. 24 (Mar. 31, 1993) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). Thejudge stated that in
prior cases in which the collateral consequences doctrine was applied, the defendants
had either intentionally committed a crime or had committed acts that were "intrinsi-
cally immoral". Id. Therefore, these defendants should have had the reasonable ex-
pectation that "serious consequences" might flow from the plea. Id.
But, according to the court, a different standard should apply in the case of an
unintentional act committed by a nineteen year old, that did not actually involve
moral turpitude. Id. The court stated that the trial judge, in order to satisfy due
process, must ensure that the defendant understands the consequences of a guilty
plea. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 63-84 (setting forth standards for valid
guilty pleas). Therefore, the judge vacated the defendant's guilty plea, holding that
failure to inform a nineteen year old who pleaded guilty to a terrible accident that
this admission could result in deportation does not meet constitutional muster. Peo-
ple v. Ford, 290 N.Y. LJ. 24 (Mar. 31, 1993) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). Thejudge further
stated that not every defendant need be informed of deportation possibilities. Id.
Rather, the court held narrowly that in cases where a reasonable person would not
realize that the plea involves an admission of an act of moral turpitude, the court
must inform the defendant of this fact. Id.
See also, David M. McKinney, Note, The Right of the Alien To be Informed of Deporta-
tion Consequences Before Entering a Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere, 21 SAN DIEGo L. REV.
195, 223-24 (1983) (arguing that because deportation can have devastating effects on
aliens and their families, and because it is relatively simple for courts to ensure that
1992-1993] COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE 1123
seven states have enacted statutes requiring judges to inform
aliens about such possibilities before accepting their guilty
pleas.1 95 In Michel, the Second Circuit referred only to judges'
duties, noting that Rule 11 was not intended to relieve attor-
neys of their responsibility to their clients.1 96 The court em-
phasized that attorneys, not courts, have an affirmative duty to
apprise defendants of potential immigration proceedings.' 97
The court in Michel also did not address whether the attorney's
failure to inform the defendant of deportation possibilities vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel. 198
In Tafoya v. State,' 99 the Supreme Court of Alaska, citing
Parrino and Sambro, held that counsel's representation was con-
stitutionally sufficient despite failure to warn the defendant of
the possibility of deportation.2 ° ° Unlike previous decisions,
aliens are aware of potential deportation consequences of their pleas, courts must
inform defendants of deportation possibilities in order to satisfy defendant's Fifth
Amendment due process rights). Despite the persuasiveness of the argument, courts
generally have held that deportation consequences are collateral to the criminal
charges, and have found that imposing a duty to inform defendants of all the collat-
eral consequences of convictions places an unmanageable burden on trial judges.
See, e.g., Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that
judges have no duty to warn defendants about deportation consequences);
Fruchtman v. Kenton, 531 F.2d 946, 949 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. den., 429 U.S. 895
(1976); State v. Malik, 680 P.2d 770, 772 (same), appeal denied, 102 Wash. 2d 1023
(1984).
195. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.40.200 (West 1990) (imposing statutory
duty upon judiciary to warn aliens about deportation possibilities before accepting
guilty pleas); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016.5 (West 1985) (same); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 54-1j (West 1985) (same); MASS. ANN. LAws. ch. 278, § 29D (Law. Co-op 1992)
(same); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.385 (1984) (same); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 26.13 (West 1992 & Supp. IV 1993) (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2943.03.1
(Anderson 1993) (same).
196. Michel, 507 F.2d at 466. The court stated that "[d]efense counsel is in a
much better position to ascertain the personal circumstances of his client so as to
determine what indirect consequences the guilty plea may trigger. Rule 11, in our
view, was not intended to relieve counsel of his responsibilities to his client." Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. Failure to address the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel prompted the court, in Strader v. Garrison, 611 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1979), to
describe Parrino and Sambro as "aberrations." Id. at 64. The court stated that
"[s]urely when ineffective assistance of counsel and prejudice are both established
relief is routinely granted." Id. Thus, according to the court in Strader, the Parrino
and Sambro courts should have viewed the cases as Sixth Amendment questions, and
granted relief accordingly. Id.
199. 500 P.2d 247 (Alaska), cert. den., 410 U.S. 945 (1972).
200. Id. at 252.
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the court in Tafoya discussed the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.2 0 ' The court held that defense attorneys have the
burden of informing their clients of collateral consequences,
but that failure to inform defendants of such consequences
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.2 °2 The
court stated that although attorneys have the duty to inform
defendants about deportation possibilities, certain attorney er-
rors, including failure to inform of a collateral consequence,
are not significant enough to warrant reversal of guilty pleas as
violations of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assist-
ance of counsel.20 3
Today, most courts that refuse to reverse guilty pleas
when attorneys fail to inform defendants of immigration
ramifications rely on the collateral consequences doctrine as
originally expressed in Parrino, Sambro and Michel.2 °4 In State v.
Malik,20 5 for example, the Washington Court of Appeals held
that potential immigration problems are beyond the scope of
trial counsels' responsibilities because they are collateral con-
sequences.20 6 The court held that counsels' duties are to aid
defendants in evaluating prosecution evidence and to discuss
potential direct consequences of guilty pleas.20 7 In Malik, the
court held that counsel offered constitutionally effective assist-
ance by discussing the direct consequences of a guilty plea,
and urging the defendant to seek the advice of an immigration
lawyer.208 Most courts that deny relief hold that counsels'
omissions do not result in unreasonable assistance pursuant to
the professional competence prong of Strickland.20 9
2. Courts Relying on Prejudice Tier of Strickland When
Refusing to Grant Relief




204. See, e.g., United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing, through reliance on Parrino and Santelises, that failure to inform defendants about
deportation consequences does not warrant revocation of guilty pleas).
205. 680 P.2d 770 (Wash. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 102 Wash 2d 1023 (1984).
206. Id. at 772.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., United States v. Gavilan, 761 F.2d 226, 228 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Campbell, 778 F.2d 764, 766 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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when attorneys fail to inform defendants of deportation pos-
sibilities base their denial on the professional competence tier
of Strickland,210 some courts base their refusal to vacate on the
prejudice tier of Strickland.' In United States v. Del Rosario,212
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, while also citing
the collateral consequences doctrine, focused its argument on
the prejudice issue. 21 3 The court stated that the defendant was
not able to show that he would not have entered a guilty plea
and would have insisted on going to trial if his attorney had
advised him of potential deportation consequences.2 14 The
court did not find any evidence indicating that the defendant
would have placed any particular importance on deportation
and cited evidence to the contrary.21 5 In Del Rosario, the de-
fense attorney, the trial judge and the defendant had discussed
the fact that deportation was a possibility, though none pur-
ported to know for certain whether deportation would result
from the conviction. 1 6 The defendant did not, at that time,
express concern about deportation. 2 7 Holding that the de-
fendant failed to show prejudice, the court emphasized that the
evidence against the defendant was strong, that he admitted
that he had "made a mistake" and that his desire to enter a
plea of "not guilty" only arose seventeen months after his
guilty plea and several months after he was served with a no-
tice of deportation. 2 8 Based on this evidence, the court re-
fused to find that the defendant established prejudice. 21 9
210. See, e.g., Gavilan, 761 F.2d at 228; Campbell, 778 F.2d at 766.
211. See United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 58 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United
States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 103 (3d. Cir. 1989).
212. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55.
213. Id. at 57-58.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 57.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id, at 58.
219. Id.; see United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989). In Nino, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit did not decide whether counsel's failure
to inform the defendant of the deportation ramification of a plea constituted unrea-
sonable attorney behavior because it determined that, even if such omission consti-
tuted unreasonable attorney behavior, the defendant still failed to establish preju-
dice. Id. at 105. The court stated that the defendant was caught with twenty-five
pounds of cocaine in a car that he was driving and he discussed his knowledge of the
cocaine with two Drug Enforcement Administration officers. Id. Thus, according to
the court, the defendant would have pleaded guilty anyway, or if he did not plead
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Concurring in the judgment, Judge Mikva expressed his
concern that, under existing law, defendants who are entirely
ignorant of deportation possibilities nonetheless will be held
to their pleas. ° Judge Mikva stated that deportation is en-
tirely unlike losing one's driver's license or losing the right to a
government job, and should not be treated like other collateral
consequences.2  In addition, Judge Mikva asserted that the
court's decision allows the district court, when weighing preju-
dice claims, to serve as "Maximum Juror" by determining
whether defendants would have succeeded at trial through a
"guesstimate" of what a jury would have decided.22 Judge
Mikva stated that no judge can be comfortable with such a
role. 223  He further recommended that Rule 11 should be
amended to require judges to inform alien defendants that
their guilty pleas may lead to deportation. 24
B. Courts Vacating or Permitting Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas When
Counsel Fails to Inform Aliens About Deportation Possibilities
Some state courts have recently vacated guilty pleas or
permitted withdrawal of guilty pleas 22 5 when counsel failed to
inform aliens of deportation possibilities. 26 Some of these de-
guilty, he would have been found guilty at trial. Id. Therefore, the court refused to
accept the defendant's claim of prejudice, finding unpersuasive the defendant's claim
that he would not have pleaded guilty if he had been aware of the deportation ramifi-
cations. Id.
220. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d at 61 (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment).
221. Id. (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment).
222. Id. (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment).
223. Id. (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment).
224. Id. (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 74-79 (describing difference between va-
cating guilty pleas and permitting withdrawal of guilty pleas).
226. See, e.g., People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527-28 (Colo. 1987) (en banc)
(holding that counsel has affirmative duty to inform defendants of areas of law that
are crucial to defendants' cases, including deportation possibilities when defendants
are aliens); People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(same); People v. Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. App. 1988) (holding that trial
court did not abuse its discretion in permitting alien who entered guilty plea without
awareness of deportation possibilities to withdraw guilty plea); People v. Giron, 523
P.2d 636 (Cal. 1974) (same). A number of other state courts have held that counsels'
failure to inform aliens of deportation possibilities constitutes ineffective assistance
of counsel pursuant to their state constitutions, but these decisions have subse-
quently been overruled. See, e.g., People v. Padilla, 502 N.E.2d 1182 (Ill. App. 1987),
overruled by, People v. Huante, 571 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1991); People v. Edwards, 393
So.2d 597 (Fla. 1981), overruled by, People v. Ginebra, 511 So.2d 960 (Fla. 1987);
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cisions, recognizing that deportation consequences are unique
and severe, hold that trial attorneys must inform aliens of po-
tential deportation consequences prior to entering guilty
pleas.2 7 Failure to do so renders counsels' assistance constitu-
tionally ineffective pursuant to the federal and state constitu-
tions.2 2 These courts have vacated guilty pleas, holding that
attorneys have an affirmative duty to investigate bodies of law
that are crucial to their clients' defenses, including deportation
possibilities when the defendants are aliens.2 9 Other state
courts have held that it is within the discretion of trial judges to
permit defendants to withdraw guilty pleas if defendants were
not aware of deportation possibilities. 3 °
1. Courts Holding That Counsel Has an Affirmative Duty to
Inform Aliens of Deportation Possibilities
Some courts have recognized counsels' duty to inform
aliens of deportation possibilities to ensure that aliens enter
valid guilty pleas.23 1 In People v. Pozo, 2 32 for example, the
Supreme Court of Colorado held that counsels' assistance is
ineffective, and thus defendants' guilty pleas may be vacated, if
counsel fails to investigate and research those bodies of law
that are crucial to their clients' defenses, which includes immi-
gration law when their clients are aliens. 3 3 In Pozo, a Cuban
citizen attempted to have his guilty plea vacated based on inef-
fective assistance of counsel because his attorney had not in-
formed him that his plea might result in deportation.3 4
The court stated that in order for pleas to be knowing,
voluntary and intelligent, counsels' assistance must have been
reasonable.23 5 The court refused to hold that attorneys have
Commonwealth v. Wellington, 451 A.2d 223 (Pa. 1982), overruled by, Commonwealth
v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92 (Pa. 1989).
227. See Pozo, 746 P.2d at 527-28; Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
228. See Pozo, 746 P.2d at 527-28; Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36.
229. See, e.g, Pozo, 746 P.2d at 529.
230. See Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d at 787; Giron, 523 P.2d at 639-40.
231. See Pozo, 746 P.2d at 526; People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335-36
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
232. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523.
233. Id. at 527-28.
234. Id. at 525. The defendant had entered two guilty pleas, receiving a two
year prison sentence for his escape conviction and a concurrent two years and six
months sentence for his sexual assault conviction. Id.
235. Id. at 526.
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an absolute duty to advise aliens of the deportation conse-
quences of their pleas, but stated that assistance is unreasona-
ble if attorneys fail to investigate relevant areas of law. 36
Criminal proceedings can result in deportation for aliens, a re-
sult that is "unique, severe, and worthy of recognition. 2 3 7 As
a result, if attorneys fail to investigate immigration law when
their clients are aliens, their representation is unreasonable
and thus the aliens' pleas are deemed involuntary. Therefore,
in order for counsels' representations to be ineffective, pursu-
ant to the federal and Colorado constitutions, defendants must
establish that the attorneys knew or had reason to know that
their clients would be affected by the immigration laws.238
As mentioned earlier, some states require judges to in-
form defendants about deportation consequences.23 9 In People
v. Soriano ,240 however, the California Court of Appeal ex-
panded counsels' duty to warn aliens of immigration conse-
quences beyond the duty required of judges pursuant to Cali-
fornia law.24 ' In Soriano, a defendant, who entered a guilty
plea for assault with a firearm and served one year in jail,
sought and received a reversal of his plea on ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. 4 2 The defendant had asked his attorney
whether he would be deported if convicted. 43 His attorney
claimed that she had informed him in a general sense that im-
migration consequences might exist.244 Pursuant to California
law, the defendant had also been informed of the potential im-
migration consequences by the trial judge. 45 The defendant
argued that if he had served one day short of one year in jail,
236. Id. at 527.
237. People v. Pozo, 712 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Colo. 1986), aff'd, Pozo, 746 P.2d
523.
238. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523. In Pozo, the record did not indicate whether the de-
fendant had satisfied this burden. Id. at 529-30. Therefore, the court remanded the
case to the trial court to determine whether the attorney was aware of the defendant's
alien status. Id. at 530.
239. See supra note 195 (listing states that require judges to inform alien defend-
ants that conviction may result in deportation).
240. 240 Cal. Rptr. 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
241. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 336. CAL. § 10 16.5(a) requires judges to inform
defendants that conviction might result in deportation. CAL. § 1016.5(a) (West
1993).
242. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
243. Id. at 333-34.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 331.
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he would not have been subject to deportation proceedings
under the relevant statute.246 Counsel admitted that although
she felt she had achieved the most advantageous criminal dis-
position, she had not considered whether it was the best possi-
ble immigration disposition. 47 Therefore, the court vacated
the defendant's guilty plea, holding that counsel's advice was
not based on an adequate investigation of immigration law,
and therefore constituted ineffective assistance of counsel pur-
suant to the federal and California constitutions. 248 The court
imposed upon attorneys a duty to warn aliens of immigration
consequences that exceeds the general warning that judges
must give to alien defendants under California law.249 In addi-
tion, the court noted that the American Bar Association's Stan-
dards for Criminal Justice provide that defense attorneys, after
appropriate investigation, should advise defendants of consid-
erations that are important to the defendant, including collat-
250eral consequences.
2. Courts Holding That It Is Within Trial Judges' Discretion
to Permit Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas When Aliens
Are Unaware of Deportation
Consequences
Some courts have held that it is within the trial judge's
discretion to permit withdrawal of guilty pleas when defend-
ants enter guilty pleas without knowledge of the deportation
246. Id. at 334-35. Immigration law permits deportation of any alien convicted
of a crime of moral turpitude within five years of entering the United States, if such
alien was either sentenced to confinement or confined for one year or more. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The defendant pleaded guilty within five
years of entry and served one year in prison. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
247. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
248. Id. at 336.
249. Id.
250. Id. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-3.2(b) (1980) states that
"defense counsel, after appropriate investigation, should advise the defendant of the
alternatives available and of considerations deemed important by defense counsel or
the defendant in reaching a decision." A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE 14-
3.2(b) (1980). The commentary following the standard states that "where the de-
fendant raises a specific question concerning collateral consequences (as where the
defendant inquires about the possibility of deportation), counsel should fully advise
the defendant of these consequences." A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14-
3.2(b) cmt. (1980).
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ramifications.2 5' In People v. Kadadu, for example, the Court of
Appeals of Michigan stated that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that refusing to permit withdrawal of
the defendant's plea would constitute a miscarriage of jus-
tice.252 The court, noting the severity of deportation and the
importance of knowledge of this possibility, found no abuse
where the trial judge decided that it would be more equitable
to permit the case to go to trial, where there was no showing of
prejudice to the prosecution. 253
C. Courts Permitting Reversal of Guilty Pleas When Counsel
Misinforms Aliens About Deportation Possibilities
Some courts state that guilty pleas may be vacated when
defendants' attorneys affirmatively misinform defendants
about the immigration repercussions of guilty pleas.254 In Peo-
ple v. Correa ,255 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that errone-
ous advice, which altered the defendant's plea, renders coun-
sel's assistance ineffective.256 In Correa, the defense attorney
wrongly informed the defendant that he would not be de-
ported as a result of his conviction because his wife was a U.S.
citizen. 57 The court did not consider whether failure to advise
would result in ineffective assistance because the defense attor-
ney made unequivocal, erroneous, misleading representations
in response to specific questions about deportability. 58 The
251. See People v. Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Mich. App. 1988); People v.
Giron, 523 P.2d 636, 639-40 (Cal. 1974).
252. Kadadu, 425 N.W.2d at 787.
253. Id. at 786-87. Decisions such as Kadadu, which rely on the trial court's dis-
cretion, do not conflict with the federal cases that deny relief because they merely
show, without implicating any constitutional rights, that judges have broad discretion
to ensure that the ends ofjustice are served. Id. But the Pozo and Soriano decisions,
which found constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel pursuant to the federal
and state constitutions due to failure to inform aliens of the deportation conse-
quences of entering guilty pleas, do create a split of authority. Compare United States
v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that failure to inform aliens
of deportation consequences of entering guilty pleas does not constitute constitu-
tionally ineffective assistance of counsel).
254. See, e.g., People v. Correa, 465 N.E.2d 507, 512 (Ill. 1985) (holding that
erroneous advice about deportation possibilities necessitates revocation of guilty
pleas due to ineffective assistance of counsel).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 512.
257. Id. at 509-10.
258. Id. at 512.
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court stated that it will find guilty pleas involuntary if counsels'
advice is not within the range of competence demanded of at-
torneys in criminal cases.259 Such erroneous advice is objec-
tively unreasonable. 2 °
Similarly, in Downs-Morgan v. United States,26' the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that when at-
torneys provide erroneous information, in certain narrow situ-
ations, such behavior may constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.2 62 In Downs-Morgan, a Nicaraguan citizen sought re-
versal of his guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, claiming that he did not know that a conviction would re-
sult in deportation, and that he feared he would be executed
upon returning to Nicaragua.263 The Eleventh Circuit held
that ineffective assistance could be found if the defendant es-
tablished the possibility of execution upon returning to Nicara-
gua, combined with misrepresentations by counsel about de-
portation consequences and a colorable claim of innocence.26
The court held that, although deportation is a collateral conse-
quence, under extreme circumstances attorneys may be held
responsible for misinforming aliens about the deportation con-
sequences of pleading guilty. 265 The court remanded the case
to determine whether the defendant was indeed misinformed
by his attorney and thus was entitled to withdraw his plea.266
Although the court held that attorney misinformation may
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel under certain cir-
cumstances, it made clear that this was the exception, not the
rule.267 In so doing, the court rejected the reasoning of the
Correa court, which stated that attorneys' misrepresentations
about deportation possibilities necessarily constitute ineffec-
tive assistance.268
In United States v. Nagaro-Garbin,269 the United States Dis-
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. 765 F.2d 1534 (11th Cir. 1985).
262. Id. at 1541.
263. Id. at 1536.
264. Id. at 1541.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1540-41.
268. Id.
269. 653 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Mich. 1987), afd, 831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987).
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trict Court for the Eastern District of Michigan also stated that
ineffective assistance may be found if counsel misinform de-
fendants about deportation possibilities.27" The court held
that if attorneys misinform defendants about deportation pos-
sibilities, such defendants may have claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel if they have colorable claims of innocence, but
counsels' simple failure to inform defendants of these pos-
sibilities is not enough.271 Under the court's holding, counsel
may not provide erroneous information about deportation,
even though the information is collateral.2 72 In Nagaro-Garbin,
the court remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to de-
termine whether counsel had affirmatively misled the defend-
ant and whether the defendant had a colorable claim of inno-
cence.
273
III. COUNSELS' FAILURE TO INFORM ALIENS OF
DEPORTATION CONSEQUENCES OF GUILTY PLEAS,
WHEN IT PREJUDICES DEFENDANTS' CASES,
CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Failure to inform alien defendants about the deportation
consequences of guilty pleas, when it prejudices their cases,
should constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 74 Often
criminal defense attorneys, unaware of the provisions of the
immigration law dealing with criminal conduct, seek only the
best disposition of criminal charges without regard to the im-
migration ramifications. 75 This behavior can result in unnec-
essary deportations as well as charges of ineffective assistance
of counsel that attorneys could easily avoid. Attorneys should
have an affirmative duty to inform alien defendants of the po-
270. Id.
271. Id. at 591.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 590-91. On remand, the lower court held that counsel had not mis-
led the defendant and, accordingly, it dismissed the defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 226-53 (analyzing cases that require at-
torneys to inform alien defendants of deportation possibilities).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 152-273 (analyzing different stances
taken by courts when aliens attempt to have guilty pleas vacated for ineffective assist-
ance of counsel when attorneys fail to inform or misinform alien defendants of de-
portation possibilities).
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tential deportation ramifications of guilty pleas. 276 Failure to
inform aliens of deportation possibilities necessarily drops at-
torneys' representations below the objective standard of rea-
sonableness required by the professional competence tier of
the Supreme Court's test that was articulated in Strickland v.
Washington .2 77 Courts must assess the prejudice tier of Strick-
land on a case-by-case basis.
A. Failure to Advise Defendants of Deportation Possibilities Renders
Counsel's Representation Objectively Unreasonable
In Strickland, the Supreme Court set forth a two-tiered test
for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 278 Aliens satisfy the
professional competence tier by proving that their attorneys
knew, or should have known, that they were aliens, and failed
to inform or misinformed them about the immigration ramifi-
cations of their guilty pleas. 279 This failure necessarily lowers
their attorneys' representations below an objectively reason-
able level.28 °
Recently, the rights of aliens have expanded in a number
of areas of law, including the right to effective assistance of
counsel.281 These changes reflect a growing awareness by the
U.S. judiciary that millions of aliens live in the United
States, 2  and that deportation, as stated by Justice Louis Bran-
deis, can result in loss of property, life and all that makes life
276. See supra text accompanying notes 226-53 (analyzing cases that require at-
torneys to inform alien defendants of deportation possibilities).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57 (explaining professional compe-
tence tier of Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
278. See supra text accompanying notes 51-62 (analyzing Strickland test for inef-
fective assistance of counsel).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57 (analyzing professional compe-
tence tier of Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
280. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (holding that
counsel's representations were unreasonable because alien defendant was not in-
formed of possibility of deportation following conviction).
281. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Pro-
cedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992)
[hereinafter Procedural Surrogates] (analyzing rapid development of procedural due
process for aliens over the past twenty years); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law
After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation,
100 YALE L. J. 545 (1990) (arguing that over last thirty years, judges who are reluc-
tant to hold that government immigration decisions are unconstitutional have some-
times used statutory interpretation to strike down these decisions).
282. See supra note 7 (setting forth immigration statistics).
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worth living.283 Congressional power over immigration is ple-
nary, but courts must interpret Congressional mandates in a
manner that treats aliens fairly. 84
Some courts have begun to recognize that deportation is a
drastic measure, often more severe than the direct results of
conviction, and thus is too extreme to be labelled a collateral
consequence.2 85 These decisions hold that knowledge of de-
portation consequences is crucial to aliens, and without such
knowledge subsequent guilty pleas are not voluntary, informed
and intelligent. 86 Defense attorneys have an affirmative duty
to investigate and research all bodies of law that are crucial to
defendants' cases. 87 Therefore, if attorneys know or have rea-
son to know that defendants are aliens, they must inform de-
fendants of the immigration ramifications.288 Failure to do so
reduces counsels' representations to an objectively unreasona-
283. See Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (holding that persons
who are admitted to United States by immigration authorities and afterwards are held
for deportation, who claim to be citizens of the United States, are entitled to judicial
hearing of such claims). Justice Brandeis stated that deportation can result in "loss
of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living." Id.
284. The plenary power doctrine, which has existed since the nineteenth cen-
tury, grants exclusive power over immigration decisions to the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government. See, e.g., Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476, 480
(1893) (holding that Congressional exclusion power is "not open to challenge in the
courts"); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706 (1893) (holding that
immigration decisions are "conclusive upon the judiciary"); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (same). The rationale for denying judicial
review of immigration decisions has been the legal fiction that deportation is not
punishment, but merely the government's decision not "to harbor persons whom it
does not want." Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913). The plenary power
doctrine has been used repeatedly to deny judicial review of substantive constitu-
tional issues. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797-800 (1977) (refusing to inter-
vene where law discriminated against aliens based on gender and illegitimacy).
The doctrine has been widely criticized for stunting the development of constitu-
tional law in the immigration area. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1984) (listing judicial deference associated
with plenary power doctrine as one factor that has helped to shelter immigration law
from developments elsewhere in legal culture). In recent years federal courts have
fashioned important exceptions to its application. See Motomura, Procedural Surro-
gates, supra note 281 (tracing rapid development of procedural due process rights for
aliens over last twenty years).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 226-53 (analyzing decisions that re-
quired attorneys to inform aliens of deportation consequences of guilty pleas).
286. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 528-29 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
287. Id.
288. Id.
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ble level.2 8 9 Thus, assuming that this failure to inform the de-
fendants prejudices their cases pursuant to the prejudice tier
of Strickland, such failure should constitute ineffective assist-
ance of counsel. 9 °
B. Weaknesses in the Collateral Consequences Doctrine
Pursuant to the collateral consequences doctrine, defend-
ants need not be informed of deportation consequences, de-
spite their severity, because they are collateral. Opponents of
the doctrine argue that defendants must be informed of depor-
tation consequences, despite being collateral, because of their
severity. Both arguments use equally conclusory logic. But
the rationale for the latter argument, that defendants cannot
truly make informed, intelligent pleas without being aware of a
consequence as significant as deportation, withstands analysis.
Courts applying the collateral consequences doctrine to depor-
tation cases, however, rely on reasoning that fails for a number
of reasons. First, although most courts state that the court
should not be burdened with informing aliens about deporta-
tion consequences, requiring that aliens be informed of depor-
tation consequences places little, if any, burden on trial
courts.29' Second, the fact that deportation is often a possibil-
ity, but not an absolute certainty, does not justify failing to in-
form aliens about deportation possibilities. Third, courts ap-
plying the collateral consequences doctrine to deportation
possibilities rely on outdated precedent that fails to take into
account the severity of deportation.29 2 Fourth, courts applying
the collateral consequences doctrine misrepresent the juris-
prudence upon which they rely. 293 The collateral conse-
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. See McKinney, supra note 194, at 224 (arguing that little court time is re-
quired to advise defendants of relevant consequences of their pleas). But see Michel
v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that requiring judges
to inform defendants of collateral consequences of guilty pleas places unmanageable
burden on trial courts).
292. See supra text accompanying notes 226-38 (arguing that deportation is too
severe to be beyond scope of trial counsels' responsibilities).
293. Compare, e.g., Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974)
(holding that judges have no duty to inform defendants about deportation possibili-
ties because deportation is a collateral consequences, while placing responsibility,
although not Sixth Amendment possibility, of informing defendants about deporta-
tion consequences upon attorneys) with State v. Malik, 680 P.2d 770, 771-72 (holding
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quences doctrine, as applied to deportation, originally stated
that judges have no duty to inform defendants about deporta-
tion ramifications.2 94 Subsequent decisions have altered the
doctrine so that attorneys also have no duty to inform aliens of
such possibilities. 95
1. Requiring That Aliens Be Informed of Deportation
Consequences Places Little Burden Upon Trial Judges
The primary justification for the collateral consequences
doctrine that courts have offered stresses that it would be un-
duly burdensome to require judges to inform defendants of all
the many potential collateral consequences of entering guilty
pleas. 96 Thus, most courts have granted defendants little lee-
way regarding pleas, requiring that defendants be on notice of
only the criminal justice consequences of guilty pleas. 97 But
the burden need not be placed on trial judges because defense
attorneys, who have a Sixth Amendment duty to render effec-
tive assistance, should have the duty to inform defendants of
such consequences.29 8 If defense attorneys have this responsi-
bility, no burden falls upon the court. Even if the burden were
placed on judges, arguments in favor of informing defendants
about deportation possibilities emphasize that deportation is
far more severe than other collateral consequences, and is
therefore sui generis. 299  Thus, even if judges cannot be ex-
that attorneys have no duty to inform defendants because of collateral consequences
rule), appeal denied, 102 Wash 2d 1023 (1984).
294. See, e.g., Michel, 507 F.2d at 466 (holding that collateral consequences rule
applies to judges, placing duty to inform defendant of deportation consequences
upon attorneys).
295. See, e.g., Malik, 680 P.2d at 771-72 (holding that attorneys have no duty to
inform defendants because of collateral consequences rule).
296. See, e.g., Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461,465-66 (2d Cir. 1974) (hold-
ing that judges need not inform defendants of many potential collateral conse-
quences of guilty pleas).
297. Id. But the line between direct, criminal justice consequences and collat-
eral consequences is unclear. For example, failing to inform defendants about ineli-
gibility for parole has been considered a direct consequence, see, e.g., Berry v. United
States, 412 F.2d 189, 192 (3d Cir. 1969), while failure to inform defendants that they
may receive consecutive rather than concurrent sentences has been considered a col-
lateral consequence, see Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 1973),
yet both are criminal justice consequences of entering guilty pleas.
298. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 527-28 (Colo. 1987).
299. See United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva,
J., concurring in the judgment).
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pected to inform defendants of all collateral consequences,
they should inform defendants about the collateral conse-
quence of deportation. Such a responsibility would place only
a minimal burden upon trial judges. This goal could be ac-
complished by amending Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ("FRCP") and related state statutes, requiring
judges to simply state that entering a guilty plea may result in
deportation for aliens. 00 Reciting this warning to defendants
would place little burden on trial judges because it would not
add more than a minute to Rule 11 guilty plea proceedings.
Several jurists have recommended such an amendment to
Rule 11 of the FRCP. Concurring in Del Rosario, Judge Mikva
recommended that the Rules Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference make such an amendment. While agreeing that Rule
11 guilty plea proceedings should be streamlined, Judge Mikva
stated that such proceedings are based upon the defendant's
knowledge of the most significant consequences of the plea,
and deportation should be among those consequences. One
court has stated that although Rule 11 does not require judges
to inform aliens of deportation possibilities, nothing prohibits
them from doing so, and providing such information would
serve the interests of justice .3 0 Thus, the primary justification
for the collateral consequences doctrine, requiring judges to
inform defendants of such consequences would unduly burden
trial courts, does not stand up to analysis. Requiring that alien
defendants be informed of deportation consequences, either
by defense counsel fulfilling their Sixth Amendment duty of
effective assistance or by trial judges fulfilling their duty under
Rule 11 to ensure that guilty pleas are entered into voluntarily
and intelligently, would place little, if any, burden upon courts.
300. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-lj(a) (West 1985). Connecticut's stat-
ute requires the judge to state that
[iJf you are not a citizen of the United States, you are hereby advised that
conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may have the
consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United
States, or denial of naturalization, pursuant to the laws of the United States.
Id.
301. United States v. Russell, 686 F.2d 35, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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2. Aliens Must Be Informed of Deportation Possibilities
Despite the Fact That Deportation Is Not a
Certainty
Another possible explanation for the collateral conse-
quences doctrine, as applied to deportation, concerns the fact
that although deportation may occur following conviction, it is
far from automatic.3 0 2 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") will not necessarily initiate deportation pro-
ceedings following conviction. Even assuming the INS does
initiate such proceedings, any number of equitable considera-
tions may prevent deportation from occurring.3 3 The Second
Circuit in Michel v. United States stated that the degree of cer-
tainty with which the consequence will be visited upon the de-
fendant is not a factor to be considered in deeming a conse-
quence to be collateral.3 °4 When pleading guilty without
knowledge of deportation possibilities, however, defendants
are not entering pleas unaware that they will be deported.
They are pleading guilty unaware that they may be deported.
The uncertainty of subsequent deportation proceedings stem-
ming from guilty pleas may be an underlying rationale for the
collateral consequences doctrine.
Even assuming such a rationale, this basis for the doctrine
fails for two reasons. First, it would require courts to establish
a threshold level of certainty beyond which consequences be-
come direct. Courts would need to state, for example, that
consequences become direct if there is a ninety percent possi-
bility that the consequence will occur. Then, attorneys would
be required to inform defendants about consequences that
reach this threshold level of certainty. Such a system would be
unmanageable, if not unworkable. Second, defendants have a
right to be informed of significant consequences and signifi-
cant potential consequences of their pleas.30 5 Even if the con-
sequence is relatively unlikely, defendants should have a right
302. See United States v. Santelises, 476 F.2d 787, 789-90 (2d Cir. 1973) (hold-
ing that deportation is not direct consequence of conviction because deportation is
not certain to occur), later appeal, 509 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1975).
303. See supra text accompanying notes 123-46 (setting forth avenues for relief
from deportation).
304. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 465-66 (2d Cir. 1974).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 63-84 (setting forth standards for valid
guilty pleas).
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to be informed of the possibility of deportation, so that they
can make their decisions about whether to enter pleas in an
informed and intelligent fashion.
3. The Collateral Consequences Doctrine Is Outdated
Precedent That Fails to Recognize the Severity of
Deportation
Despite the weaknesses in the arguments supporting the
collateral consequences doctrine, the doctrine still retains con-
siderable precedential support.30 6 The collateral conse-
quences doctrine, however, as applied to deportation, is more
amenable to historical than legal analysis. The doctrine devel-
oped during the 1950s when the rights of aliens were less of a
concern to the judiciary than they are today. 0 7 The small
value placed on the rights of aliens by the U.S. court system in
the 1950s is perhaps best conveyed by a 1950 Supreme Court
decision. In this decision, the Court held, in response to an
alien's argument that he had been denied due process of law,
that as far as aliens are concerned, due process is nothing more
or less than the procedure that Congress authorizes.3 0 8 In re-
cent years, the Supreme Court has taken a somewhat more ex-
pansive view of the rights of aliens, but the collateral conse-
quences doctrine, as applied to deportation proceedings, still
remains from an earlier era. 0 9
Because the arguments regarding the burden on the judi-
ciary and the uncertainty of deportation do not withstand anal-
ysis, no legitimate rationale underlies the collateral conse-
quences doctrine as applied to deportation proceedings. The
doctrine fails to recognize that immigration consequences of
306. See supra text accompanying notes 152-208 (describing cases that rely on
collateral consequences doctrine).
307. See United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954) (holding that de-
portation is a collateral consequence that aliens need not be aware of before entering
guilty pleas), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954).
308. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950).
The Supreme Court held that "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is,
it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned." Id.
309. See Ardestani v. INS, 112 S. Ct. 515, 521 (1991). The Supreme Court
stated that "[wie are mindful that the complexity of immigration procedures, and the
enormity of the interests at stake, make legal representation in deportation proceed-
ings especially important." Id.; see also Motomura, supra note 281 (tracing rapid de-
velopment of procedural due process rights for aliens over last twenty years).
1140 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LIWJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1094
criminal convictions are "unique, severe, and worthy of recog-
nition. 31 0 Labeling the consequence of deportation as collat-
eral does not diminish its significance, especially because in
many immigration cases the collateral consequence is more se-
vere than the penalty imposed.31 ' Although many collateral
consequences do not merit retraction of guilty pleas, deporta-
tion is far more significant than other consequences, such as
losing one's driver's license or losing the right to vote.3" 2 In
order for pleas to be voluntary, defendants must be aware of
any and all significant consequences. Therefore, if deportation
is a possible result from entering guilty pleas, attorneys must
inform defendants of this possibility prior to their pleas, or
such pleas are not intelligently made, despite the collateral na-
ture of the deportation proceedings. 1t
Applying the definition of collateral consequences es-
poused in Michel v. United States, any consequences not meted
out by sentencing courts, no matter how severe and no matter
how likely to follow from the sentencing courts' decisions, are
310. People v. Pozo, 712 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Colo. 1986), a ffd, 746 P.2d 523
(Colo. 1987) (en banc).
311. See, e.g., United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, 924 (2d Cir. 1954) (Frank,
J., dissenting).
312. See United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Mikva,
J., concurring in the judgment); see supra, notes 220-24 and accompanying text (ana-
lyzing United States v. Del Rosario). This recognition of the distinction between depor-
tation and other collateral consequences was perhaps best stated by Judge Mikva in
his concurrence in Del Rosario. United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 61 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment). Judge Mikva stated that deporta-
tion
is unlike losing one's driver's license, or the right to own firearms, or the
right to a government job - each of which the majority describes as a simi-
larly weighty deprivation. The possibility of being deported can be - and
frequently is - the most important factor in a criminal defendant's decision
how to plead. Because deportation is in a category so obviously distinct
from the other collateral consequences enumerated by the majority, I have
sore difficulty crediting the fiction that the defendant has knowingly pled
when he is not provided meaningful information about the relevant deporta-
tion consequences of his plea.
Id. This argument does not preclude the possibility that failure to inform defendants
of other collateral consequences, which are not as distinct and severe as deportation,
such as forfeiture of assets or civil liability that may lead to bankruptcy, may also
result in ineffective assistance of counsel.
313. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987) (en banc) (holding that at-
torneys must inform defendants of possibility of deportation in order for pleas to be
intelligently made).
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collateral.3 4 Therefore, defendants need not be informed of
these consequences by the courts or by their attorneys.3" 5 This
narrow approach preserves the definition of collateral conse-
quences, while limiting the importance of the right of defend-
ants to be aware of relevant consequences of guilty pleas.3 6
The defendant suffers harmful consequences irrespective of
the proceeding from' which the consequences stem.31 7
Unquestioning allegiance to precedent explains the continued
vitality of the collateral consequences doctrine. Relying on
precedent, cases that deny aliens claims of ineffective assist-
ance of counsel merely state that deportation is a collateral
consequence and thus defendants need not be informed of the
possibility.31 8 Scant consideration is given to whether the pre-
cedent is one that merits adherence.
Although centering its argument on the prejudice tier of
Strickland, the court, in United States v. Del Rosario, for example,
followed the precedent of most federal courts by endorsing the
collateral consequences doctrine.3 9  The court stated that
although deportation may. be harsh, other collateral conse-
quences are also harsh. 0 It offered no further explanation.
The court did not refute the analysis of cases that required at-
torneys to inform defendants of deportation possibilities, but
merely stated that such cases were not controlling.
3 2 1
314. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974).
315. Id.
316. See Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 256 (Alaska), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 945
(1972) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
317. See Parrino, 212 F.2d at 924 (Frank, J., dissenting).
318. See, e.g., Del Rosario, 912 F.2d at 58-59 (holding that deportation is collat-




321..Id. It seems evident that the court's emphasis on the prejudice tier of
Strickland reflects discontent with the collateral consequences doctrine. Past cases
merely held that counsel's failure to advise does not constitute unreasonable attorney
behavior, not addressing the issue of prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell,
778 F.2d 764, 766 (1 th Cir. 1985) (holding that counsel's representation was rea-
sonable pursuant to professional competence prong of Strickland despite failure to
inform defendant of deportation possibilities) Because the D.C. Circuit centered its
argument on prejudice, following this extended discussion with a brief discussion of
collateral consequences, one senses that the reason is the court's realization of the
lack of doctrinal support for the collateral consequences rule. See also United States
v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989) (denying relief based on prejudice prong of
Strickland test, while declining to rule on professional competence prong of).
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes has stated that there is no
worse reason for the continuation of a law than that it has ex-
isted for a great number of years.32 He stated that this propo-
sition is particularly true when the grounds for the law have
vanished and it continues to be employed through blind imita-
tion of the past.323 Justice Holmes's position is especially accu-
rate with respect to the collateral consequences doctrine as ap-
plied to deportation. 2 4 The collateral consequences doctrine
developed in an era that was harshly insensitive to the rights of
aliens. 325 Today, although thejudiciary is somewhat more sen-
sitive to the rights of aliens, allegiance to precedent has per-
petuated a doctrine that does not reflect current judicial think-
ing. The better view, stated by Justice Rabinowitz of the
Supreme Court of Alaska, dissenting in Tafoya v. State, 2 6
stressed that attorneys should have an affirmative duty to re-
search federal law governing convictions of aliens and to in-
form defendants of potential deportation possibilities stem-
Although the Supreme Court in Strickland stated that courts need not discuss both
tiers of Strickland if the case is more easily disposed of through reliance on one tier,
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984), this possibility does not adequately
account for the court's reliance on the prejudice prong. If the court was merely con-
cerned with disposing of the case using the prong that provided the simpler solution,
it would have relied solely on the professional competence prong because the deci-
sion was obvious in light of the applicable federal precedent. See supra note 184 (list-
ing decisions that have held that attorney's representation is effective despite failure
to inform alien of deportation consequences).
322. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469
(1897). Justice Holmes stated
[it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
Id.; see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the majority's reliance on the historic existence of sodomy laws for refusing to
find a sodomy statute unconstitutional.)
323. Holmes, supra note 322, at 469.
324. See supra notes 306-21 and accompanying text (stating that collateral conse-
quences doctrine developed during 1950s when rights of aliens were less important
to judiciary than today and no legitimate rationale supports doctrine's continued vi-
tality)..
325. See supra notes 307-08 and accompanying text (describing judicial view of
rights of aliens during 1950s). The Second Circuit decided United States v. Parrino,
the first decision to hold that deportation is a collateral consequence of conviction, in
1954. United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. den., 348 U.S. 840 (1954).
326. 500 P.2d 247, 257 (Alaska) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting), cert. den., 410 U.S.
945 (1972).
1992-19931 COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES DOCTRINE 1143
ming from guilty pleas.32 7 He further stated that if one reaches
the conclusion that deportation of aliens is merely a collateral
consequence of their guilty pleas, one must view the right to
live in, as well as banishment from the United States, as mat-
ters of little consequence. 28
4. The Collateral Consequences Doctrine, Applied to
Deportation, Misrepresents the Jurisprudence on
Which It Is Based
Even assuming that the justifications for the collateral con-
sequences doctrine as applied to deportation proceedings
withstand analysis, the doctrine still distorts the jurisprudence
upon which it is based. As originally set forth in Parrino and
Sambro, the rule stated that defendants need not be aware of
potential immigration ramifications due to the collateral nature
of deportation proceedings.3 29 The courts, in Parrino and Sam-
bro, did not distinguish between the judge's failure to inform
the defendant about deportation consequences and the de-
fense attorney's failure to inform.3 30 Thus, these decisions are
unhelpful because they fail to evaluate counsel's representa-
tions in terms of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.
In Michel, the Second Circuit elaborated upon the reason-
ing behind the collateral consequences doctrine, stating that it
is beyond the scope of trial judges to consider the many con-
tingencies of convictions. 3 3 ' Thus, even assuming that depor-
tation constitutes a collateral consequence of conviction, the
Michel court only applied the collateral consequences doctrine
to judges' duties. 3 2 Furthermore, the Michel court stated that
defense attorneys, not judges, have a duty to advise defendants
of deportation possibilities. 333 According to the Michel court,
judges must deal with overburdened dockets and thus lack the
time to sort through every contingency, but attorneys have a
327. Id.
328. Id. (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
329. Parrino, 212 F.2d at 921-22; United States v. Sambro, 454 F.2d 918 (D.C.
Cir. 1971) (per curiam), motion for rehearing en banc denied, 454 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (per curiam).
330. Parrino, 212 F.2d at 921-22; Sambro, 454 F.2d at 922-23.
331. United States v. Michel, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974).
332. Id.
333. Id.
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duty to represent clients zealously." 4 Attorneys do not satisfy
this duty of zealous representation when they fail to research
relevant bodies of law.A
In Michel, the court justified its refusal to impose an affirm-
ative duty upon judges by placing the responsibility to warn
defendants upon defense attorneys." 6 The weakness in the
court's analysis, as in Parrino and Sambro, is its failure to ad-
dress whether counsel's representation was constitutionally in-
effective pursuant to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Still, the Second Circuit, in Michel, placed an affirmative duty
upon defense attorneys to warn defendants about deportation
possibilities." 7 Subsequently, courts espousing the collateral
consequences doctrine have relied on Michel for the proposi-
tion that defense attorneys have no duty to warn their clients
of these consequences," 8 though Michel stated just the oppo-
site, that attorneys have the responsibility to inform defend-
ants about potential deportation problems." 9 These courts
have altered the application of the collateral consequences
doctrine, as originally applied in Parrino, Sambro and Michel,
leaving aliens without any means of learning about the poten-
tial effects of guilty pleas.340 Although the court in Michel did
not state that defense counsel's failure to inform provides the
defendant with an avenue for relief, the court's primary justifi-
cation for not placing responsibility upon the trial judge was its
statement of the responsibility of trial counsel. 34' This justifi-
cation is hollow if defendants lack the right to enforce trial
counsel's duty.
Tafoya is one of the few decisions where a court attempted
to justify this leap in reasoning. The Supreme Court of Alaska
stated that the appearance of anomaly is due to the collateral
334. Id.; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1992) (stat-
ing that "[t]he duty of a lawyer ...is to represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law ..
335. People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 529 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
336. Michel, 507 F.2d at 466.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 252 (Alaska), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1972); State v. Malik, 680 P.2d. 770, 771-72 (Wash. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 102
Wash.2d 1023 (Wash. 1984).
339. Michel v. United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974).
340. See, e.g., Tafoya, 500 P.2d at 252; Malik, 680 P.2d at 771-72.
341. Michel, 507 F.2d at 466.
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nature of the deportation proceedings. 4 2 Although attorneys
have the duty to warn aliens of deportation possibilities, failure
to inform defendants of these possibilities is not a ground for
vacating guilty pleas because these consequences are collat-
eral.343 This decision recognizes the leap in reasoning made
by other courts, but the court in Tafoya unjustifiably dismisses
the importance of deportation by summarily labelling it a col-
lateral consequence.3 44 In addition, the court stated that alien
defendants have the right to be informed of deportation conse-
quences, but eliminated their ability to receive remedies for vi-
olations of their rights by refusing to grant relief based on the
attorney's failure to warn about such consequences. 45
5. Problems with Inflexibility of the Collateral
Consequences Doctrine
The inflexibility of the collateral consequences doctrine,
which prevails in most federal courts, has forced courts to cre-
ate strained exceptions to the rule. 46 In some cases, federal
courts have ignored the doctrine's existence in reaching their
conclusions.3 4 7 Despite the persuasive arguments of courts
that permit reversal of guilty pleas due to counsels' failure to
warn about immigration ramifications, the majority of courts,
hesitant to overrule precedent, have not adopted this
stance. 48 As a result, a number of courts have forged logically
inconsistent exceptions to the collateral consequences doc-
342. Tafoya, 500 P.2d at 252.
343. Id.
344. See'id. at 256 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting) (arguing that deportation is not
merely collateral consequence of criminal convictions).
345. Id. at 252.
346. See, e.g., Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11 th Cir.
1985) (holding that representation may be ineffective if counsel misinforms defend-
ant about deportation consequences, if defendant has colorable claim of innocence,
and defendant faces execution upon returning to native country); United States v.
Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586, 591 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that representa-
tion is ineffective if counsel misinforms defendant about deportation consequences
of guilty plea and defendant has colorable claim of innocence), af'd, 831 F.2d 296
(6th Cir. 1987).
347. Janvier v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), on remand from,
793 F.2d 447 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that counsel's failure to request Judicial Rec-
ommendation Against Deportation constituted ineffective assistance of counsel while
not addressing fact that deportation is collateral consequence of criminal conviction).
348. See supra note 148 (listing courts that have refused to permit withdrawal of
guilty pleas because of collateral consequences doctrine).
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In Downs-Morgan,35° the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, apparently hesitant to overrule precedent,
created an extremely limited exception to the collateral conse-
quences doctrine.3 -1 The court stated that the attorney's mis-
representation, combined with the possibility of imprisonment
and execution upon the alien's return to Nicaragua, in addition
to a colorable claim of innocence, may be sufficient for a find-
ing of ineffective assistance. 52 Thus, the court created an ex-
ception to the collateral consequences doctrine, because the
jurisdiction usually considers deportation a collateral conse-
quence.
Courts adhering to the collateral consequences doctrine
cannot logically support such a holding. If attorneys have no
duty to research deportation repercussions, their duty cannot
change based on the severity of their clients' situations upon
returning to their native lands.3 53 Attorneys' freedom from in-
vestigating collateral consequences is absolute, allowing no
leeway for the severity of defendants' plights.3 54 Although the
court was sympathetic to the Nicaraguan citizen's situation,
courts espousing the collateral consequences doctrine have de-
termined that, while immigration consequences may be harsh,
relief is not possible because of the collateral nature of the
proceedings.3 55  Therefore, the court's logical choices were
either adherence to the doctrine, resulting in deportation of
the Nicaraguan citizen, or rejection of the doctrine, which
would grant him the right to a jury trial.3 56
349. See supra notes 226-38 and accompanying text (analyzing decisions that
have permitted withdrawal of guilty pleas where counsel misinformed defendants
about deportation consequences of guilty pleas).
350. 765 F.2d 1534 (11 th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 261-67 and accompanying
text (analyzing Downs-Morgan v. United States).
351. Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534 (11 th Cir. 1985).
352. Id. at 1541.
353. See supra note 163 (stating that severity of deportation cannot disturb final-
ity of guilty pleas).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See also United States v. George, 676 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd,
869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989). The decision in George provides another example of a
decision creating an inconsistent exception to the collateral consequences doctrine.
Although it was reversed on appeal, the decision of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois is clearly another strained attempt to reach a just deci-
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In United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, the U.S. District Court for
sion when faced with the inflexibility of the collateral consequences doctrine. In
George, a permanent resident was ineligible for discretionary relief from the Attorney
General because the date of his deportation order was ten days short of the seven
year period required for such relief. Id. at 867. If the defendant had not pleaded
guilty, the delay would most likely have resulted in the completion of the seven year
period and he would have been eligible for discretionary relief. Id. The court held,
therefore, that defendant's attorney, an immigration lawyer, had represented him in-
competently. Id. at 868. The court found that where counsel knows, or should know,
the immigration consequences of a plea, no legitimate difference exists between ac-
tive misrepresentation and passive failure to advise. Id.
This holding correctly recognized the importance of knowledge of deportation
possibilities, but it did not go far enough. Courts should not inquire into whether
defense attorneys are immigration law practitioners. Many criminal defendants, in-
cluding aliens, are not able to choose their own counsel and they should not be dis-
advantaged based on the specialties of the attorneys that represent them. Therefore,
attorneys for alien defendants should have a duty to investigate immigration reper-
cussions regardless of whether they are immigration law practitioners. See People v.
Soriano, 240 Cal Rptr. 328, 335-336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that counsel,
though not immigration law practitioner, had duty to familiarize herself with immi-
gration law in order to represent her client effectively).
But despite the strained reasoning of the district court, it seems that the court, in
order to reach a just result, had no option because the collateral consequences doc-
trine as applied to deportation possibilities does not allow for exceptions. See supra
note 163 (stating that severity of deportation cannot disturb finality of guilty pleas).
On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit -reversed the
district court's decision, though not for the reasons discussed here. United States v.
George, 869 F.2d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1989). The Seventh Circuit held that the
defendant's attorney had no duty to inform him about deportation possibilities be-
cause such possibilities are collateral consequences. Id.
The court's decision in People v. Ford, 290 N.Y. L.J. 24 (Mar. 31, 1993) (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1993), see supra note 194, which held that the collateral consequences doc-
trine does not apply in certain narrow, fact specific situations, is similarly flawed. Id.
The court held that in cases where a reasonable person would not be aware that a
guilty plea suggests an "admission of grossly immoral activity," the trial judge must
inform the defendant that this plea might result in deportation as a crime of moral
turpitude. Id. Pursuant to the collateral consequences doctrine, judges are not ex-
pected to inform defendants of all the contingencies associated with conviction but
merely those directly associated with that specific criminal proceeding. See Michel v.
United States, 507 F.2d 461, 466 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that, pursuant to collateral
consequences doctrine, judges have no duty to inform defendants about deportation
consequences) One cannot logically impose a greater duty on judges in cases where
the defendant might not be aware that conviction involves an admission of moral
turpitude. As in Downs-Morgan, the court's logical choices were either acceptance of
the collateral consequences doctrine, resulting in the defendant's deportation, or re-
jection of the doctrine, which would permit the court to hold that the trial judge has
an affirmative duty to inform the defendant about deportation possibilities.
Although the decision in Ford may reach a just result, it does so in an illogical
manner. The court should have rejected the collateral consequences doctrine, be-
cause any attempt to create exceptions to the doctrine, directly contravenes its sup-
posed purpose, which is to minimize the burden on trial judges. Id. Although the
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the Eastern District of Michigan also created a strained excep-
decision only requires judges to inform a small group of defendants of deportation
possibilities, it nevertheless places a large burden on the court. In order to deter-
mine which aliens may not be aware that admission of guilt constitutes an admission
of grossly immoral activity, the trialjudge must take three steps. First, the court must
determine whether each defendant is an alien. Then, the court must become familiar
with immigration law in order to determine whether the crime being pleaded to in-
volves moral turpitude. Finally, if the defendant is an alien who is guilty of a crime of
moral turpitude, the judge must determine whether the defendant should reasonably
be aware that entering a guilty plea involves an admission of grossly immoral activity.
Placing such a severe burden on the trial judge cannot be squared with the collateral
consequences doctrine. Id. Requiring trial judges to inform all defendants that if
they are aliens they may be deported as a result of pleading guilty places a far smaller
burden upon trial judges. See supra text accompanying notes 299-301 (arguing that
requiring judges to inform defendants that if they are aliens they may be deported if
they plead guilty places minimal burden upon trial judges).
But even if this narrow exception to the collateral consequences doctrine were
logically supportable, it would more appropriately place the duty to inform upon
defense attorneys rather than judges. While strong arguments support placing a
duty upon judges to inform aliens about the possibility of deportation, see McKinney,
supra note 194 (arguing that judges should have duty to inform defendants about
deportation possibilities), any greater duty to research the likelihood of deportation
should be placed on defense attorneys who have a greater responsibility toward de-
fendants. See People v. Soriano, 194 Cal. App. 3d 1470 (1987) (placing greater duty
upon attorney to warn defendant about deportation possibilities than that required
pursuant to California law).
But the Ford court's decision suffers from a greater flaw. It appears to support
the right of a sympathetic defendant to be informed of deportation consequences,
while rejecting the right of less sympathetic defendants to be aware of such conse-
quences. The court makes the somewhat incredible assertion that
[i]t is one thing not to tell a drug dealer or a person who intentionally causes
serious injury that the plea may involve other serious consequences such as
deportation, but it is quite another thing not to tell a nineteen year old who
thought ... that he was admitting to a terrible accident, that consequences
of the plea would result in deportation ... certainly a major consequence to
a nineteen year old whose family lives in New York.
People v. Ford, 290 N.Y. L.J. 24 (Mar. 31, 1993) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993). The court
supports this assertion by stating that drug dealers and persons who intentionally
cause serious injury
would have had the reasonable expectation that since the episode to which
[they] pled involved the intentional breaking of the law or an act universally
recognized as involving intrinsic immorality that serious consequences
might flow from the plea.
Id.
These assertions suffer from three errors. First, courts that apply the collateral
consequences doctrine have never assumed that defendants reasonably expect that
certain consequences, such as deportation, might occur, but rather that regardless of
awareness of the consequence, the guilty plea will be considered valid because of the
collateral nature of the consequence. See Michel, 507 F.2d at 466 (holding that judge
need not inform defendant about deportation possibilities because deportation is
collateral consequence, not because defendant should have reasonable expectation
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tion to the collateral consequences doctrine. 5 7 The court held
that if attorneys misinform aliens about deportation conse-
quences, as opposed to simply failing to inform, and defend-
ants present colorable claims of innocence, courts may vacate
guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.3 58 The
distinction that the court drew between misinforming defend-
ants and failing to inform defendants is specious because in
either case defendants lack relevant information about depor-
tation possibilities. Thus, if deportation is merely a collateral
consequence, misinformation provided by attorneys is still col-
lateral and courts should not consider these errors to consti-
tute unreasonable attorney behavior.3 5 9 The more persuasive
view states that whether misinformed or uninformed, attor-
neys' representations should be deemed unreasonable if alien
defendants lack knowledge of immigration consequences.3 60
that deportation might result). Second, due process requires that judges ensure that
defendants are aware of the consequences of their pleas. See supra text accompanying
notes 63-84 (setting forth due process requirements for valid guilty pleas). It does
not permit judges to presume knowledge based on a "reasonable expectation" of
"severe consequences". See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (permitting
withdrawal of guilty plea because judge did not take affirmative steps to ensure that
plea was entered into voluntarily and intelligently). If the court is willing to acknowl-
edge that a plea cannot be valid without knowledge of deportation possibilities, then
the court must take affirmative steps to ensure that the defendant is aware of the
possibilities. Id.
Finally, even ifjudges could presume that certain defendants have a reasonable
expectation that deportation might result from entering guilty pleas, no rational basis
supports the court's statement that "drug dealers" are more likely to be aware of this
possibility than a young man convicted of manslaughter, accidental or otherwise.
Just as Mr. Ford was unaware that he might be deported, many individuals who plead
guilty to drug offenses are equally unaware. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 778
F.2d 764 (11 th Cir. 1986) (rejecting defendant's argument that she should be permit-
ted to withdraw guilty plea to possession ofmarijuana because she was unaware that
her conviction, which resulted in a sentence of two years probation, would result in
deportation). Many drug offenses result in short prison terms or probation. Id. One
would not necessarily expect that a crime that is treated relatively leniently under the
penal law would have such drastic deportation ramifications.
357. United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd,
831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987); see supra text accompanying notes 269-73 (analyzing
United States v. Nagaro-Garbin).
358. United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd,
831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987); see supra text accompanying notes 269-73 (analyzing
United States v. Nagaro-Garbin).
359. See supra note 163 (stating that severity of collateral consequence is not
taken into account).
360. See supra notes 275-345 and accompanying text (arguing that attorneys
must inform aliens of deportation consequences of guilty pleas).
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The holding in Janvier v. United States is also inconsistent
with the collateral consequences doctrine.36" ' In Janvier, the
court reversed the defendant's plea, holding that the attorney's
failure to request aJRAD, and to investigate applicable law was
inadequate under prevailing professional norms.3 62 Janvier is
irreconcilable with the prevailing doctrine of collateral conse-
quences.s63 If applying for aJRAD only had repercussions in a
collateral civil deportation proceeding, then it was necessarily
beyond the scope of counsel's responsibilities, according to
the collateral consequences doctrine. 3 64 Attorneys must only
inform defendants of direct consequences and, according most
federal courts, deportation is collateral.3 65 Therefore, coun-
sels' failure to inform cannot drop the attorneys' representa-
tions below an objectively unreasonable level. Injanvier, the
court may not have discussed the collateral consequences doc-
trine, because recognition of the doctrine, which prevails in
most federal courts, would have necessitated a holding of rea-
sonable attorney behavior, conflicting with the equitable dis-
position of the case.
The cases that have granted relief by creating strained ex-
ceptions to the collateral consequences doctrine share two
characteristics. First, they are cases in which the consequence
of deportation is especially severe and unjust.366 As stated
previously, however, the severity of the consequences sur-
rounding deportation is irrelevant if courts purport to employ
the collateral consequences doctrine. 67 Furthermore, these
courts create exceptions to the collateral consequences rule
361. See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text (analyzing Janvier v. United
States).
362. Janvier v. United States, 659 F. Supp. 827, 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1987), on remand
from, 793 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1986).




366. See Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1536 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(stating that defendant was subject to imprisonment and possible execution upon
returning to Nicaragua); United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (stating that defendant was subject to fifteen year prison term upon re-
turning to Peru), aff'd, 831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. George, 676 F.
Supp. 863, 867 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that de-
fendant was ten days short of-eligibility for discretionary relief).
367. See supra note 163 (stating that severity of collateral consequence is not
taken into account).
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that are not logically consistent. 36  This effort underscores
discontent and disagreement with a rule that is inelastic, se-
vere, and unjust to aliens. But the collateral consequences
doctrine is at odds with placing any duty on attorneys to in-
form defendants about deportation effects, regardless of their
severity.369 As a result, courts have had no option but to fash-
ion strained exceptions and inconsistent judgments .370 Rather
than continuing to employ a doctrine that lacks any legitimate
rationale and persists only through imitation of the past, courts
must reject the collateral consequences doctrine as applied to
deportation proceedings and recognize the right of aliens to be
aware of the immigration ramifications of guilty pleas.3 7 '
C. The Prejudice Tier of Strickland in Deportation Cases
Although courts should find that failing to inform or mis-
informing aliens about the deportation consequences of guilty
pleas is objectively unreasonable attorney behavior, thus satis-
fying the professional competence tier of the Strickland test,
courts should assess prejudice on a case-by-case basis, pursu-
ant to tier two of Strickland.372 To satisfy this tier, defendants
must show that counsels' objectively unreasonable behavior re-
sulted in prejudice to their cases. This tier requires a case-by-
case analysis, where defendants must show that if their attor-
neys had behaved reasonably, they would not have entered
guilty pleas and would have insisted on going to trial.3 73
1. The General Test for Prejudice Pursuant to
Tier Two of Strickland
Courts must balance the severity of the criminal sentences
368. See supra text accompanying notes 346-65 (analyzing inconsistencies in de-
cisions that permit withdrawal of guilty pleas when attorneys misinform defendants
about deportation consequences of guilty pleas).
369. See supra note 163 (stating that severity of collateral consequence is not
taken into account).
370. See supra text accompanying notes 346-65 (discussing inconsistencies in de-
cisions that permit aliens to withdraw guilty pleas when attorneys misinform them
about deportation consequences).
371. See, e.g., People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523 (Colo. 1987) (en banc); People v.
Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
372. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62 (analyzing prejudice tier of Strick-
land test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
373. Id.
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against the severity of the punishment of deportation in order
to determine whether it is plausible that defendants would
have insisted on going to trial if aware of the deportation pos-
sibilities.37 4 The determination of prejudice depends on the
nature of the charge of ineffectiveness.3 75 For example, in Hill
v. Lockhart, 6 the court explained that if the defendant pleaded
guilty because counsel impermissibly failed to discover excul-
patory evidence, the court must determine whether the addi-
tion of that evidence would have affected the outcome of the
trial, and therefore the defendant's plea. 7 7 Similarly, if coun-
sel had failed to put forth an affirmative defense, the court
must determine whether that defense would have affected the
outcome. 378 These situations both relate to substantive as-
pects of the trial, and hinge on whether the outcome at trial
would have been effected if counsel had not erred.3 7 9
In contrast, when defendants seek to have guilty pleas set
aside due to ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel
did not inform the defendants of the repercussions of their
pleas, these defendants claim that if made aware of the reper-
cussions, they would not have entered guilty pleas, thereby
waiving their constitutional right to trials by jury.38 :They
claim that the drastic nature of the potential penalties would
have induced them to proceed to trial.3 8 ' Therefore, to satisfy
the prejudice tier of Strickland, defendants must show, using
specific circumstances, that they would not have entered guilty
pleas had they been aware of the potential consequences.
2. The Prejudice Tier of Strickland in Del Rosario
v. United States
When weighing prejudice, courts should not rely upon
374. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(holding that defendant did not establish prejudice); United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d
101, 105 (3d Cir. 1989) (same).
375. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
376. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 85-92 (analyzing Hill v. Lockhart).
377. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(stating defendant's argument that he would not have entered guilty had he been
aware of deportation consequences).
381. Id.
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their own determinations of the defendants' chances of suc-
ceeding at trial. Rather than focusing on whether defendants
have colorable claims of innocence, the more appropriate in-
quiry is whether defendants would have entered guilty pleas if
they had been aware of the deportation possibilities. The guilt
or innocence of defendants is certainly a factor considered by
defendants when deciding whether to plead, but it is an inap-
propriate determination for judges to make.382 Such inquiries
give judges the right to unfairly eliminate defendants' constitu-
tional right to trials by jury based on personal determinations
of guilt.
Unlike most cases that refuse to find ineffective assistance
of counsel based on the collateral consequences doctrine, the
court in Del Rosario explained why the defendant failed to meet
his burden of proof under the prejudice tier of Strickland.383
Although the court may have reached the proper result, its
analysis is flawed in several respects. Most notably, the court
relied upon its own determination of the defendant's chances
of succeeding at trial, holding that the defendant did not have
a colorable claim of innocence.384 Judge Mikva's concurrence
correctly criticizes the court for relying on its own "guessti-
mate" of what a jury would have held if the case had gone to
trial.385 Such determinations should not be viewed as "find-
ing[s] of fact."' 386 Trial judges should not attempt to deter-
mine what juries would have decided, especially because cases
where the evidence appears overwhelming frequently result in
jury acquittals.
Another error made by the court in Del Rosario in deter-
mining prejudice was its apparent reliance solely on the trial
record.387 The court found evidence in the transcript support-
ing the conclusion that the defendant placed no particular em-
phasis on deportation. Additionally, the court found no evi-
382. See id. at 61 (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that judges
cannot be comfortable with role of determining what juries would have decided had
case gone to trial).
383. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d at 56; see supra notes 211-19 and accompanying text
(describing treatment of prejudice tier of Strickland test for ineffective assistance of
counsel in United States v. Del Rosario).
384. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d at 58.
385. Id. at 61 (Mikva, J., concurring in the judgment).
386. Id.
387. Id. at 57.
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dence supporting the defendant's contention that he would
not have entered a guilty plea had he been aware of the poten-
tial deportation consequences.38 8 Certainly the transcript may
be used to refute the defendant's assertions. Extrinsic evi-
dence, however, should also be admissible because deporta-
tion was not an issue at the time the defendant entered a plea.
Therefore, defendants will not be able to support their claims
without the admission of extrinsic evidence, because the rec-
ord will not generally support the defendants' contentions.
The court's third error in rating prejudice was its determi-
nation that the defendant delayed his motion to vacate his plea
and must therefore have stronger reasons in support of his
claim than he would have needed had he moved to vacate his
plea earlier.3 .9 First, it is irrelevant that the defendant did not
challenge the assistance of his attorney until seventeen months
after his plea,39 0 because any charge of delay could only begin
to run after the defendant was informed that deportation pro-
ceedings were being instituted against him. Second, the court
stated that the defendant waited "some months" after he had
received notice of the deportation action before claiming inef-
fective assistance of counsel.3 ' It may take "some months,"
however, for a prisoner to research and file an action once
made aware of the deportation proceeding.
Judges instead should inquire as to whether the severity of
the initial punishments are so harsh as to make the added pen-
alty of deportation insignificant, and the defendants' claims
that they would not have entered guilty pleas had they known
about deportation possibilities implausible. Application of this
prejudice standard to Del Rosario could potentially support the
court's holding, but it could also support a holding of preju-
dice. The defendant was sentenced to four to twelve months
in prison, a relatively short sentence. The court's opinion in
Del Rosario does not indicate whether the defendant had strong
ties to the United States, but the severity of deportation cer-
tainly could have swayed his decision to plead guilty in light of
the relatively light prison sentence. 9 2 On the other hand, the
388. Id.
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conversation about deportation at trial is, arguably, strong
enough evidence to deny the defendant's claim, because if de-
portation was particularly important to him, he probably would
have stated so when the issue arose prior to his plea. 93
3. Advantages of Focusing on Prejudice Tier of
Strickland v. Washington
Strickland v. Washington created a severe doctrine, which
only permits reversal of guilty pleas after satisfaction of a two-
tiered analysis that has been compared to the "eye of the nee-
dle. '394 This approach, which places the burden of proof on
defendants, is an almost insurmountable barrier. Courts are
obviously reluctant to accept ineffective assistance claims,
made clear by the fact that courts have rejected more than
ninety-five percent of ineffective assistance claims since the
Supreme Court decided Strickland in May 1984.395 The small
percentage of successful claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel evidences a reluctance on the part of the judiciary to
permit defendants, sometimes years after their pleas or trials,
to start the trial process over again. This reluctance is no
doubt due in part to the fact that as time passes, memories
fade, evidence disappears, and criminal cases become harder
to prove. It also reflects a belief that convicted criminals
should not escape justice due to what are perceived as techni-
calities. And perhaps most of all, it reflects a belief that con-
victed criminals will not hesitate to lie in order to get released
from prison.
The collateral consequences doctrine was undoubtedly
fashioned in a similar spirit. The problem with the doctrine, as
seen in Downs-Morgan and Nagaro-Garbin, is its severity. 396 It
makes no exception for cases that are meritorious, and courts
393. Id.
394. Sullivan v. Fairman, 819 F.2d 1382, 1391 (7th Cir. 1987). The court stated
that "we expect that few petitioners will be able to pass through the 'eye of the nee-
dle' created by Strickland." Id.
395. See Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-
Based Standard For Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L. J. 413,
458 app. I (1988) (stating that as of May 30, 1988, only 4.3% of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims had been successful in federal circuit courts).
396. See supra text accompanying notes 346-71 (arguing that courts have used
strained reasoning to reach just results because of fear of overruling established pre-
cedent).
1156 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 16:1094
are forced to create strained exceptions or accept the limita-
tions of the doctrine.
Elimination of the collateral consequences doctrine as ap-
plied to deportation cases, with a shift in focus onto the preju-
dice tier of the Strickland test, grants courts the flexibility to
vacate guilty pleas when the facts of the case so require, and
the ability to refuse to vacate pleas when the facts indicate that
deportation would not have altered the original plea.397 The
small percentage of cases that succeed under Strickland ensures
that elimination of the collateral consequences will not create a
deluge of vacated guilty pleas.39 8 Relying on the prejudice tier
of Strickland, courts have the discretion to deny relief to de-
fendants with minor ties to the United States who plead guilty
to serious crimes with lengthy prison sentences.399 On the
other hand, courts may vacate the pleas of defendants who
have strong ties to the United States and have pleaded guilty to
minor offenses.4 00
One might argue that this Sixth Amendment approach will
fail to solve the problem of defendant ignorance regarding de-
portation possibilities because it essentially limits relief to peti-
tions for habeas corpus. Because defendants often have the
same lawyers during the direct appeal process, these lawyers
are unlikely to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel against themselves. Thus, relief will only occur through
habeas corpus petitions, which rely heavily on the defendant's
credibility in establishing both unreasonable assistance and
prejudice, and seldom result reversal of guilty pleas.40 But, as
stated previously, the purpose of this analysis is not to produce
a deluge of plea reversals, but merely to provide an avenue for
relief in extreme cases. Therefore, the probability of only a
small percentage of plea reversals is not troubling.
The more significant effect that this Sixth Amendment
397. See supra text accompanying notes 58-62 (analyzing prejudice tier of Strick-
land test).
398. See supra note 395 (noting small percentage of cases that succeed under
Strickland test).
399. See supra text accompanying notes 85-92 (describing application of preju-
dice tier of Strickland test to cases where defendants have pleaded guilty based on
counsels' unreasonable representations).
400. Id.
401. See Calhoun, supra note 395 (noting small percentage of cases that succeed
under Strickland test).
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analysis should provide is increased awareness among defense
attorneys that they have an affirmative duty to inform aliens
about deportation possibilities, and that failure to do so ren-
ders their representations ineffective. This awareness will lead
to a great percentage of defense attorneys taking steps to en-
sure that their clients are aware of deportation possibilities.
One might further argue that a Rule 11 approach, requir-
ing judges to inform defendants about the possibility of depor-
tation, would be more effective in ensuring that defendants re-
ceive the relevant information.4 °2 If trial judges simply raise
the issue, defense attorneys would be sure to cover the subject
with their clients prior to their plea allocutions. Although this
argument may be correct, amendment of Rule 11 seems un-
likely, and, in addition, a Sixth Amendment analysis provides
broader relief than a Rule 11 approach.
Under a Rule 11 approach, the judge merely informs the
defendant about the possibility of deportation. Any further re-
search into the matter must be done by the defendant or by
counsel. Without this Sixth Amendment analysis, a defendant
who is informed of the possibility of deportation by the trial
judge, but subsequently receives erroneous or insufficient ad-
vice from counsel regarding the specifics of immigration law,
would not be able to obtain relief.40 3
Applying the prejudice tier of the Strickland test, rather
than the professional competence tier of Strickland, to cases
that created strained exceptions to the collateral consequences
doctrine produces far more logical and consistent results than
the decisions themselves reached. In Downs-Morgan, the court
held that the possibility of execution upon returning to Nicara-
gua, combined with misrepresentations by the defense attor-
ney and a colorable claim of innocence may justify vacating a
guilty plea for ineffective assistance of counsel.40 4 The threat
of execution is extremely persuasive on the issue of prejudice.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 296-301 (describing possible amend-
ment of rule 11).
403. See People v. Soriano, 240 Cal. Rptr. 328, 335-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that defendant received ineffective assistance, despite being informed of
possibility of deportation by trial judge, because counsel did not research immigra-
tion law and therefore failed to inform defendant that sentence of one year subjected
him to deportation, but sentence of one day short of one year would not subject him
to deportation).
404. Downs-Morgan v. United States, 765 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11th Cir. 1985).
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A defendant is unlikely to plead guilty if the plea would result
in execution. Thus, the attorney's failure to inform the de-
fendant of deportation possibilities renders his representation
unreasonable, and the possibility of execution upon returning
to Nicaragua satisfies the prejudice tier of Strickland, establish-
ing the defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel .40 5
Similarly, in Nagaro-Garbin, focusing on the prejudice tier
of Strickland could result in vacating the defendant's guilty plea
due to ineffective assistance of counsel.4 °6 The defendant in
Nagaro-Garbin was subject to a fifteen year prison term upon
returning to Peru.4 °7 To reach the court's desired result, it
could have held that this impending prison sentence would
have induced the defendant to plead not guilty, thereby satisfy-
ing the prejudice tier.
Because guilty pleas result in the waiver of important con-
stitutional rights, courts must view the prejudice tier of the
Strickland test as one that favors defendants. Courts must take
405. Id. Focusing on the prejudice tier of Strickland in United States v. George,
676 F. Supp. 863 (N.D. Ill. 1988), rev'd, 869 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1989), see supra note
356 (analyzing United States v. George) provides a more logically consistent decision
than the district court reached and a more just decision that the Seventh Circuit
reached. In George, the defendant would clearly be permitted to withdraw his guilty
plea because he satisfies the prejudice tier. If the defendant had not pleaded guilty,
the delay involved in going to trial would have resulted in the defendant accumulat-
ing seven years of permanent residency, making him eligible for discretionary relief.
George, 676 F. Supp. at 867. It is extremely unlikely that any defendant would plead
guilty when simply delaying conviction would result in the defendant becoming eligi-
ble for relief from deportation.
Similarly, in People v. Ford, 290 N.Y. LJ. 24 (Mar. 31, 1993) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1993), see supra note 194, reliance on the prejudice tier of Strickland would permit the
judge to vacate the defendant's guilty plea. In Ford, it was apparent that the district
attorney arranged a lenient plea because of the accidental nature of the crime com-
mitted. Id. If the defendant's attorney had informed him of the deportation pos-
sibilities of a guilty plea, it is likely that he would not have pleaded guilty, but would
have attempted to plead to a reduced charge that is not considered to involve moral
turpitude. Id. Because the district attorney offered a lenient plea, it is quite plausible
that he would have agreed to a further reduced charge that would permit the defend-
ant to avoid deportation. Therefore, the attorney's failure to inform the defendant of
deportation possibilities renders his representation unreasonable, and the strong
possibility that the district attorney would have permitted him to plead to a reduced
charge that would eliminate the possibility of deportation satisfies the prejudice tier
of Strickland.
406. United States v. Nagaro-Garbin, 653 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Mich. 1987), aff'd,
831 F.2d 296 (6th Cir. 1987).
407. Id. at 588.
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precautions against weighing heavily the guilt or innocence of
defendants, and must only refuse to vacate pleas when it is
overwhelmingly clear that the defendants' pleas would not
have been different had they been informed of the deportation
consequences. Applying the test in this way ensures that un-
meritorious claims do not result in reversal of pleas, while mer-
itorious claims have an appropriate avenue for relief.
CONCLUSION
The collateral consequences doctrine, as applied to depor-
tation proceedings, is precedent that lacks any supportable ra-
tionale. Created during the 1950s, when the rights of aliens
were even less important to the judiciary than they are today,
the doctrine effectively eliminated any remedy for aliens who
pleaded guilty to crimes without being aware that they might
be deported as a result.40 8 Attorneys have an affirmative duty
to research all significant ramifications of guilty pleas, and fail-
ure to research and inform defendants about deportation
ramifications is inconsistent with basic, objective standards of
reasonable attorney behavior. For pleas to be voluntary and
intelligent, they must be made with sufficient awareness of all
important ramifications. Courts must weigh ineffective assist-
ance claims on a case-by-case basis to determine the impor-
tance of such knowledge. Courts must balance the severity of
deportation to defendants against the severity of the crimes
committed and the punishments imposed to determine
whether such knowledge would have been significant. If courts
determine that such knowledge was significant, prejudicing the
defendants' cases, then courts must vacate defendants' pleas
due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Guy Cohen*
408. See supra note 163 (stating that severity of collateral consequence not taken
into account).
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